The invention of gunpowder closes the first great epoch in organised warfare.
Gunpowder was introduced into Europe by the Moors, who employed artillery as early as the siege of Saragossa, in 1118. The Spaniards used it at Cordova, in 1280, and against Gibraltar, in 1306. Towards the end of the fourteenth century, handguns of curved fire were invented, and a few years later those of direct fire as well. In 1414, muskets were first employed at the siege of Arras.
At the beginning of the fifteenth century, much discussion prevailed as to the respective merits of the bow and the arcbouche, or arquebus - a tube of iron, fixed in a small log, which was fired by applying a match to the vent. The weapon was held against the breast, the musketeer receiving the full force of the recoil. One author writes: "Their advantage is, they pierce all defence of armour and lighting upon a place of the body, the wound whereof endangereth life, they bring with them certain death." Yet death was often slow in coming, for eighteen different motions were required in loading alone; and with some of these early firearms ninety-nine movements had to be gone through before making moderately certain of the weapon going off. Further, this writer adds: "Were a hundred musketeers and a hundred bowemen, eche digested into ten files, eche file containing ten men, the bowemen shall be able to shoote at once a hundred arrows for their ten bullets."
This slowness of fire was undoubtedly the main disadvantage of the early musket.
During the fifteenth century, great progress was made in artillery, and, by the middle of it, cannon were in general use. At first they were much laughed at, and according to one authority they were "sometimes useful in frightening horses." Very often they blew up; besides, the crude powder used gave off such an abominable stink, that escorts had to be provided, not to protect the gunners, but to keep them from deserting their pieces. At the siege of Constantinople, 1453, Muhamed II made extensive use of ordnance. One of his guns was of enormous size; it required fifty oxen to drag it, two hundred men, one hundred on each side of it, to keep it from toppling over, and two hundred and fifty in front to clear the way for its advance. This piece took two hours to load, and at the eighth round it blew up!
At about this time, the first half of the fifteenth century, Zisca, the famous leader of the Hussites, was beginning to teach the German nobles and pikemen that their day of reckoning was at hand. His system of war gave a fresh impulse to the employment of infantry in place of cavalry.
For many years the Russians and Ukraines had surrounded their encampments with portable barricades of stakes; further, these wandering Tartars had employed a system of defence common to most nomadic tribes, namely, that of laagering their waggons, just as the Boers of South Africa did in their early treks. At Poitiers, the Black Prince drew up his waggons in open laager behind his knights and archers. This was usually done in the Middle Ages. The Belgian cities in their wars had adopted the circular laager as a moveable fortress, placing infantry and artillery within it. Zisca, who had been employed by the Belgium cities, now adopted this rampart of waggons as the pivot of his tactics. Under him, this fortified laager became known as the Wagenburg. In this moving fortress he placed his infantry, cavalry and guns. He would then let the enemy's cavalry and pikemen exhaust themselves against the ring of waggons, from which archers, crossbowmen and hand-gunners kept up a continuous shower of missiles. Once demoralisation had seized upon his enemy's ranks, Zisca would issue out with his cavalry and charge the retreating foe. ("The Influence of Firearms upon Tactics," pp. 3 and 4.)
Zisca organised a special corps of waggoners, on whose efficiency everything depended; they were drilled, and taught to manouvre their vehicles with accuracy and promptness.
"At the word of command, we are told, they would form a circle, a square or a triangle, and then rapidly disengage their teams, thus leaving the waggons in proper position, and only needing to be chained together. This done, they took up their position in the centre of the enclosure. . . . The organisation of the whole army was grounded on the waggon as a unit: to each was told off, besides the driver, a band of about twenty men, of whom part were pikemen and flailmen, while the remainder were armed with missile weapons. (After the Burgher wars, 1388, each German Knight attached to his person as body-guard one pikeman and one archer.) The former ranged themselves behind the chains which joined waggon to waggon, the latter stood in the vehicles and fired down on the enemy. From the first, Zisca set himself to introduce firearms among the Bohemians; at length nearly a third of them were armed with 'hand-guns,' while a strong train of artillery accompanied every force." ("The Art of War in the Middle Ages," p. 126. Oman.)
The chief points of interest in this method of warfare are: First, the increase in missile-throwing weapons to demoralise an enemy assault from a defensive position. Secondly, an increase of infantry to use these weapons in order to attack these laagers, cavalry being quite useless.
The warfare of the moving-fortress was not destined, however, to endure for long, for the extraordinary progress made in the manufacture of artillery, during the second and third quarters of the fifteenth century, soon rendered such victories as Deutschbrod, 1422, Aussig, 1426, and Taus, 1431, impossible. The Wagenburg was abandoned, and a return was made to cavalry methods of warfare; these in their turn were soon to be replaced by a powerful and well-armed infantry.
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, a banneret of Landsknechts consisted of four hundred men, fifty of whom were arquebusiers. Ten such bannerets formed the tactical unit of the day, and the five hundred arquebusiers, or "shots," belonging to it, were employed as flankers, or skirmishers, to hold back the enemy whilst the phalanx was closing its ranks preparatory to the charge. When attacked by cavalry these flanking troops sought refuge within the ranks of the pikemen, the phalanx formation in which these heavy infantrymen marched being maintained throughout the sixteenth century.
At the battle of Pavia, in 1525, we find fifteen hundred Basque arquebusiers (the arquebus was introduced to the English Army in 1521) thrown out by the Imperialists in front of the French gendarmerie in the form of a regular light infantry skirmishing line; and though, prior to this battle, the Swiss had, for a similar purpose, made use of crossbowmen and handgunners, this, I believe, is the first instance of a skirmishing line of trained light infantry armed with the arquebus.
Brantome describes their training as follows: "I here set forth the action of the Marquis de Pescaire at the battle of Pavia, which I once read of in his life, in which the author relates how (though I give this in French I will translate it word for word from the Spanish, so that it may the more readily be believed) the said marquis won this battle by means of his Spanish arquebusiers, contrary to all rules of war or dispositions of battle, by a veritable confusion and through a great want of order. It must be realised that 1,500 of the most skilful, practised and artful arquebusiers, and above all the most fleet and nimble, were dispersed by the order of the Marquis de Pescaire. These men (these are the very words) had been instructed in the new precepts of the Marquis, and were practised, by a long training, to extend, without word of command, by squads over their entire camp, to wheel round, to face about from this side to that, now here, now there, with the utmost rapidity. Thus they baffled the fury of the horse, in such a manner, through this novel system of fighting, that these arquebusiers unembarrassed and most wonderfully, though cruelly and villainously, discounted with much ease the power of the French cavalry, who were utterly ruined; for they, collecting together in a mass, were overthrown by these few excellent and brave arquebusiers. This unmethodical and novel system of fighting is more easily imagined or fancied than described; and whoever pictures it clearly will find it both worthy and useful. But it is necessary that the arquebusiers are well trained, and picked as from a sorting board (as one says) and above all well led." ("Hommes Illustres." Brantome. Twenty-seventh Discourse.)
By the close of the sixteenth century, the three arms were assuming positions of proportionate value, and, as early as 1528, we find a German author writing: "When a lord wishes to expend 300,000 florins on a war, he must give 100,000 for the mounted equipment, another 100,000 for the artillery, and the last 100,000 for the infantry," which shows that the three arms were beginning to be held in equal respect.
The great progress in artillery made during the fifteenth century (In France under Henry IV., there existed 400 "bouches à feu d'artillerie de terre;" at the death of Louis XIV., 7,192 ; under Louis XV., 8,683; under Louis XVI., 10,007; and, in 1813, 27,976. "Des changemens survenus dans I'art de la guerre depuis 1700 jusqu'en 1815." Par le Marquis de Chambray 1830.) was replaced in the sixteenth by an equal, if not a greater, progress in the development of the musket; and so rapid was its improvement that, towards the close of this century, we find in the companies of Maurice of Nassau, an equal number of pikemen and musketeers, and this notwithstanding the fact that the rate of fire was still very slow. Sir John Smythe in his "Certain Discourses Concerning the Formes and Effects of Divers Sorts of Weapons, etc.," published in 1590, tells us that not only were volleys further than forty paces useless, but that the rapidity of the bow was still four times as great as that of the firearms of his day.
In Maurice's army it was still the custom to distribute the musketeers on the flanks of the pikemen, but, by degrees, a new formation was adopted, for, as the musketeers became more numerous, they were organised in separate bodies of skirmishers and were placed at the four comers of the square of pikes.
As the efficiency of the musketeers increased, the clumsy solid square of pikemen was replaced by a hollow one; and, to render the whole flexible, its sides were formed into separate units, the space inside being reserved for the musketeers as a refuge from cavalry. Maurice next opened out the hollow square, placing his battalions in "echequier," and divided his force, as years earlier the Swiss had done, into three "battles" - an advanced guard, a main body and a rear guard. It is interesting to note that this three "battle" formation, from the days of the Roman legion, with its hastati, principes and triarii, to that of the modern battalion, with its firing line, supports and reserves, has maintained its superiority over all other attack formations. Maurice further introduced the company system, dividing each company into three sections, the central one of pikemen, or heavy infantry, the outer two of musketeers, or light, the musketeers being placed on the flanks to protect the pikemen from surprise. He reduced the deep formations from twenty-five ranks to ten, which, in his opinion, was the least number which would allow of continuous fire.
Having reorganised his infantry, he turned his attention to his guns, and reduced the numerous calibres of the field-guns then used to 24-, 12- and 6-pounders. He substituted cartridges with iron balls for the hail shot which had hitherto been used, and he attached to his battalions a certain number of light guns, just as machine-guns are allotted today, holding back his heavy guns to open and cover the attack. We find here the beginnings of artillery taking the place of infantry as the demoralising agent of the battlefield. In later centuries, the same attempt to replace skirmishers by guns was made by Frederick the Great, and later by Napoleon, and in each case it ultimately failed.
To make the successive employment of troops feasible, we have seen that Maurice abandoned the hollow square for the "echequier" formation, each side of the square forming a separate unit, or, more frequently, the leading face of the square became the advanced guard (Vorhut), the two sides of the main guard, or main body (Gross), and the rear face the rear-guard (Nachhut). He now reduced his regiments of infantry to one thousand men each, each regiment being composed of two battalions, a battalion consisting of four companies; each battalion could therefore, if necessary, form a hollow square of its own. By employing these small units in a ten rank formation, pikes in the centre and musketeers on the flanks, a greater mobility was attained. Further, by advancing in successive lines, he caused his opponents to expend the whole of their force against his first and second "battles," whilst he kept his third in reserve for the decisive blow.
What Maurice really did was, by means of small and mobile bodies of men, to combine the shock of the pikemen with the fire-power of his musketeers; his musketeers were, in fact, true light infantry.
The elemental formation of light troops is the extended line, a line in which every missile weapon can be brought into play; of heavy troops, the contracted line, or column, not because the column produces shock by impact, but because it supplies the front rank with men to replace casualties, and so maintains its wall-like nature which is so necessary to the assault. It should not be very deep; Cyrus realised this centuries before this age. When he heard that the Egyptian phalanx was ranged a hundred deep, he said: "As to phalanxes that are too deep to reach the enemy with their weapons, what injury can they possibly do to the enemy, or what service to their fellow combatants? Those soldiers that are ranged a hundred in depth," added he, "I would rather choose to have ranged ten thousand in depth, for, by that means, we should engage with a still smaller number, and have the fewer to engage; but from the number with which I shall deepen our phalanx, I think that I shall render the whole efficient and self-supporting." "The Cyropædia." Xenophon, vi. 3. 22. Seldom have truer words been spoken.
This fundamental rule of tactics was now being slowly relearnt, for we find the Swiss phalanx and the heavy massed columns of the French feudal cavalry growing thinner and thinner in order to reduce their vulnerability to fire. The musketeers had, however, still to fight in several ranks, because reduction of vulnerability to fire was of less importance than continuity of fire, and only as the musket improved could the ranks of the musketeers be reduced.
Early in the sixteenth century, the value of the line to attain fire superiority and to reduce casualties was recognised, and attempts were made to develop fire and to support it by keeping a reserve in hand. The musketeer combat allowed of these tactics, the pikemen being kept well back as long as the fire-fight endured. From a contemporary manuscript we read: " 'The one body must advance immediately in succession to the other' (Battle of Cerisola, 1544). The plan did not work well as the infantry pikemen were too slow, so a considerable body of cavalry was selected for this purpose." "The Influence of Firearms upon Tactics," p. 19.
This cavalry was commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel, whose duty it was to attack at the last moment, and at the spot where he saw the greatest demoralisation was taking place. This is an interesting fact, for in these various formations we see the pikemen steadily supplanted by musketeers and cavalry. The same forces are at work which produced the Byzantine Cataphracti and archers of a thousand years before. The musketeers who, in their employment at Pavia, were solely light infantry, are, under Maurice, and we shall see even more so under Gustavus Adolphus, steadily ousting the heavy infantry. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries we shall see how these musketeers themselves become heavy infantry, and how, in order to destroy them and protect them, a new light infantry had to be created.
Even a greater military reformer than Maurice of Nassau was his contemporary, Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden. Like Maurice, he improved the firearms of his day; he introduced cartridges, lightened the musket, and dispensed with the rest. He replaced the matchlock by the wheel-lock; improved the soldiers' equipment; rendered field-guns more mobile, and, like Maurice, attached these to his infantry battalions and provided them with case-shot.
His improvements immediately suggest his tactics, namely: increased mobility and fire-power, the two essentials of the light infantry fight.
Like Maurice, Gustavus abandoned the hollow square, and made use of the three line formation. Later on he secured the line by flanking it with cavalry, just as Edward the Black Prince had flanked his archers with mounted and dismounted men-at-arms. But so strongly was the musket asserting its sway, that the nobility were abandoning the lance for the wheel-lock. Heavy armour was being discarded, partially on account of its uselessness, partially because, at this date, a mixing of the European breeds of horses had diminished their carrying power, and mainly because of its inconvenience to movement. Mounted infantry now takes the place of cavalry, the sword and lance are discarded, and the dragoon appears armed with the pistol. The origin of the dragoons is attributed to Marshal de Brissac, who mounted some of his arequebusiers and called them dragoons from the weapon, the dragon, with which they were armed.
With the abandonment of the arme blanche, cavalry lost their mobility, and had actually to be protected by an escort of foot musketeers; for though the individual lancer was inferior to the individual dragoon, the dragoon's pistol was not a match for the infantryman's musket. A mounted man equipped with a firearm is nearly always inferior to an infantryman, and on foot he is little better off, since he has a horse to attend to and to remind him of retirement; for, whilst an infantryman's line of retreat may be in any direction, that of a cavalryman depends on the position of his horse. Gustavus Adolphus fully realised that a cavalryman without the arme blanche is reduced to the position of a scout, consequently, he retained the sword and ordered his cavalry to advance in squadrons between the infantry lines. The foot musketeers opened the battle, and under their fire the dragoons galloped forward, fired their pistols and then, drawing their swords, charged home.
Gustavus Adolphus, by introducing the wheellock and cartridge, was able to reduce his musketeers from ten ranks to six, but, in action, these six were frequently reduced to three; the result of this was an enormous development of fire-power. The Imperialists, still adhering to the heavy column formation, "were compelled to guard against being outflanked by the formation of their opponents, to place all their troops in one line, while the Swedes were enabled to form their troops in several lines. Consequently, when the line of the Imperialists was forced at any part they could never bring up fresh troops to support the decisive point." ("A Precis of Modern Tactics," p. 226. Home, 1892.)
Gustavus organised his army in brigades, each brigade consisting of two regiments, each of about two thousand men, in two battalions of one thousand each, each in eight companies, each of which had seventy-two musketeers and fifty-three pikemen.
COLUMN FORMATION OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS AT THE BATTLE OF BREITENFELD.
Column consists of three battalions, namely A, B and C, flanked by D and D1. Leading Company of pikes (A) is flanked by fire of musketeers F and F1, whose front is protected by fire of Company B. The object of this column is to combine shock, fire and movement. Company C is in local reserve.
THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV
As the musketeers increased and the pikemen diminished, the column was drawn out more and more into a line. This, in its turn, led to a further increase in cavalry to outflank these extended frontages, until outflanking became a recognised manuvre; with the result that, for the first time, since the days of the legion, did the attack equipose the defence. The shield wall, the archers and their stakes, the phalanxes and the waggon fortresses were strong because they were defensive formations, but the cannon and the musket had now rendered them all alike useless if not impossible. Once the power of the attack became superior to the defence, manuvrmg grew to be an art; it took the place of fire and shock. To be able to manceuvre with skill was to be a great general. At the battle of the Dunes, 1650, for the last time for many years, do we find the Spanish, under Conde, employing a light infantry skirmishing line as it had been employed at Pavia one hundred and twenty-five years earlier. At this battle, Condé and Turenne were badly defeated, and we see the skirmishing line no more. Condé, Montecuculi, Mercy, Turenne and Luxemburg, little by little adopted the new system of war, until at Fleurus, 1690, and at Neerwinden, 1693, Marshal Luxemburg proved himself a master of manouvre.
As manouvring took the place of fighting, fortresses and fortified towns, as pivots of manouvre, rose into importance, and still further changed the aspect of warfare. Fortresses meant sieges, sieges gave rise to a new soldier - the grenadier - also to large convoys, which, though they tempted the attacks of irregular sharpshooters, do not seem to have given rise to a light infantry organisation to protect them.
Marlborough, Eugene, Vendome, Vauban, Villars, Vilroy and others, though they added considerably to the sciences of fortifications and strategy, added little to the art of tactics; and though, as we shall see, towards the close of the War of the Spanish Succession, a few ill-trained sharpshooters made their appearance, there was so little idea of what light infantry could do, and had done, that Eugène, in 1702, planned to surprise Vendome's army, during the Luzara campaign in Italy, whilst it was pitching its tents. And it was only through an accident that a soldier, climbing up a dike close to the camp, discovered the entire Austrian army lying behind it.
Mass-fire of both infantry and artillery now becomes the order of the day, just as the massing of pikes was the rule during the age of the mediaeval Swiss; for this mass-fire was a necessary means of concentrating fire against those parts of the enemy's line it was intended to outmanouvre. The triple line of collective fire now takes the place of the individual fire of the skirmisher who, as a trained sharpshooter, disappears from the European battlefields for close on a hundred and fifty years.