British Light Infantry in the 18th Century

The war having terminated disastrously in 1781, the first military labour which occupied the energies of the government at home was not to examine the tactical lessons of the war in order to improve the army, the faulty training of which had rendered this war calamitous, but to reduce the army in order to increase votes and save expense. This began early in 1783.

If, before the outbreak of the war, the condition of the army had been bad, a few years after its close it was deplorable, and under the military regime of Pitt the army became, as we shall see, a greater danger to the nation than to her enemies.

The ignorance of the British corps of officers of 1775 was of a Stygian density, for a few only knew the rudiments of tactics and the history of war. Ewald, in Vol. II. of his "Belehrungen, etc.," informs us: "I was sometimes astonished when American baggage fell into our hands . . . to see how every wretched knapsack, in which were only a few shirts and a pair of torn breeches, would be filled up with military works such as 'The Instructions of the King of Prussia to his Generals,' 'Thielkes Field Engineer,' the partisans Jenny and Grandmaison. . . . This was a true indication that the officers of this army studied the art of war while in camp, which was not the case with the opponents of the Americans, whose portmanteaux was rather filled with bags of hair powder, boxes of sweet-smelling pomatum, cards (instead of maps), and then often, on top of all, novels or stage plays."

The Americans began their rebellion on the strength afforded them by many excellent riflemen, hunters by occupation, backwoodsmen, and a few battalions of local militia. The majority of the colonists eventually took up arms, and a deadly guerilla war was waged in which drill-square trained officers and men, lacking war experience and the knowledge of history, were worse than useless.

The American guerilla was crafty and fearful, courageous and timid, elated and despondent, seldom balanced and, therefore, easily subjected to panics. The old tactics of Bouquet, which had proved so successful against savage or irregular, were replaced by the tactics of Gage, Howe and Cornwallis, which were based on the line formations of Frederick the Great, and which were the very worst imaginable formations ever adopted in the history of war against nimble and skilful riflemen.

The Americans in this war, as Quartermaster von Minnigerode tells us, "lie singly behind trees, bushes, stone walls and rocks, shoot at long range and with certainty, and run away very fast as soon as they have fired. The Germans cannot shoot a third so far, and can still less catch them running." Robert Jackson makes a similar observation. He writes: "They exercised the firelock with effect while they were under cover; they retired when the enemy approached near, that is, they split and squandered, according to the cant phrase, to rally at an assigned point in the rear." Against such foes, close, compact and ridged formations, were useless; they offered the minimum of mobility with the maximum target surface. To attack agile skirmishers by means of a shoulder-to-shoulder formation is like attacking a swarm of angry wasps with a sledgehammer. It is preposterous. Though some of the higher British leaders do not seem to have grasped this until well into the war, many of their subordinates did, with the result that as the war proceeded, not only was it realised that skirmishers must be destroyed by skirmishers, but that, when attacking any foe not obsessed by some tactical dogma, such as the dogma of close order, a general loosening of the ranks tended towards lessening casualties, and consequently, gaining victories.

TACTICAL CHANGES

Nearly every modem war has found an army well drilled and has left it well trained, and the American War of Independence proved no exception to this rule. Nearly every war of the eighteenth century opened with close order battles and ended by the heavy infantry having, so to speak, in the fever of war sweated forth, in spite of themselves, a cloud of light infantry, which unfortunately evaporated directly the war fever abated. During the War of the Spanish Succession, we find Croats and Tyrolese; during the War of the Austrian Succession, Pandours and Grassins; during the Seven Years War, Jaegers and Chasseurs in Europe, and in America, Light Infantry and Rangers; and now during the American War of Independence, Riflemen and Sharpshooters, each springing up as a necessity of war, and then disappearing once peace has been declared to give place to the unthinking drilled infantry of the line. Drill, drill, drill, soul-killing, heart-destroying, body-racking drill.

In 1783, drill reasserted its sway, but six years of guerilla warfare had sadly shaken its hitherto unshakable reputation. The drill of Prussia was re-established, but it was not quite the same drill as it had been in 1775; it was quicker, looser, not so beautiful, still deadening, but not quite so numbing as of yore.

The rifle companies, which had sprung up in every battalion, were abolished; but abolition of formation and organisation could not carry with it the obliteration of the fact that with a rifle a soldier could hit a man four hundred yards away, whilst with an ordinary firelock it was scarcely possible to hit at that range a division of cavalry in mass.

Abroad, the war was being studied. In Germany, Colonel von Ewald was writing books in which the deeds of the light infantry, British and German, were set forth in all their attractiveness. Frederick the Great was at last bringing himself to admit that light troops - infantry as well as cavalry - were a necessity. Besides the works of von Ewald, General von Ochs, a Hessian, wrote with emphasis on the useful lessons he had learnt from the American riflemen, and his work was finally adopted in a modified form by Frederick the Great, who, in the last years of his reign, organised three light infantry regiments, and secured for their training the services of many Hessian, Brunswick and Anspach officers who had seen service in America. His successor increased this force, in 1787, to twenty battalions of Fusiliers ("Tactics" (Infantry), Vol. I., Colonel Balck, p. 21, gives number of Fusilier battalions as 24,) and, in 1788-89, he published their Regulations, largely drawn from the experiences of the American skirmishers. "The American War was of infinite use to the German soldiers. Ten years later they applied the lessons learned there in defending their own country, and the best officers and the best soldiers in the war with France were those who had served in America," such as Domberg, Langen, York and Gneisenau.

In France, I have not been able to trace any immediate effect of the American tactics on the training of the French soldier. "The Rules and Regulations" of the French Army, published in 1791, shows no sign of an unbending; yet a time was rapidly approaching when men like Lafayette were to teach the ill-trained armies of the Revolution the tactics of the American sharpshooter.

In England, the only direct military effect of the war was to weaken, in place of strengthen, the army. Inwardly, however, a revolution was slowly taking place which spelt destruction to the old regime. By 1781, the British soldier had lost the solidity and precision which had distinguished him at Fontenoy and Minden. Formations were looser and the depth of ranks was now two files in place of three.

". . . British officers returned from America with a fixed idea that the firearm was now all in all, that the shock of the bayonet was so rare as to be practically obsolete, and that the greater the frontage of fire that could be developed the better" ("History of the British Army," Vol. III., p. 529. Hon. J. W. Fortescue.) The officers who had remained in England during the war objected to such unheard of soldiership, and the chief amongst these was Colonel David Dundas, of whom later on we shall hear more.

ACTION ON THE VIGNIE, 1778

The American War had seen regulars fighting irregulars, first by means of regular tactics, that is, the tactics of the day; secondly, by irregular tactics, the tactics of improvisation. It may be supposed, therefore, that the military school at home had reason on its side, as the successes the regulars had gained, by means of their irregular tactics, were against irregulars and not against regular soldiers. This was, however, not the case, whatever reason might dictate, for, in 1778, at St. Lucia, unreasoning experience showed how a British force, out-numbered by four to one, met a force trained in the School of Frederick, and made "absolute havoc of it."

From a light infantry point of view, the battle which took place on this occasion is of particular interest, and as it is fully dealt with by Fortescue ("History of the British Army," Vol. III., p. 265.) I will only examine such details as more particularly refers to the light infantry attack.

General Medows commanded the British force. He was an officer of the new school, that is the humane school, as we shall shortly see.

The light infantry "advancing in skirmishing order, and keeping themselves always under cover . . . maintained at close range a most destructive fire upon the heavy French columns. If the French attempted to extend, they threatened a charge with the bayonet; when the French closed up, they were themselves already extended and pouring in a galling fire; when the French advanced with solidity and determination, they retired as if beaten, and disappeared, but only to renew their fire, invisible themselves, from every direction."

The French left four hundred dead on the field, and acknowledged a loss of twelve hundred in wounded. The English casualties were thirteen killed and one hundred and fifty-eight wounded.

Medows was a leader worthy of his brave men. He was wounded early in the fight, but never for a moment did he leave the field, "and when the action was over he visited every wounded officer and man before he would receive the surgeon's attention himself." It was men like Medows, who, within the next twenty-five years, were going to reform the British Army and render it invincible.

Fortescue writes: "The action on the Vignie (St. Lucia, 1778) is also notable in itself, being the first example of the employment of the new British tactics, learned in America, against the old system favoured in Europe.

The French were puzzled beyond measure by the work of the British light infantry. They had chasseurs of their own, but these were never supposed to make any serious resistance, whereas five companies of British chasseurs had made havoc of two battalions which out-numbered them by four to one, not only by defence but by counter-attack. . . . Every officer and man of this force knew what to do, and did it; whereas the French, though they fought bravely enough, were absolutely at a loss. In fact, the behaviour of Medows battalion was exactly that of the famous Light Division in its palmiest days; thus confirming the forgotten fact that Moore's reforms in tactics were built on the experience of America." "The British Army, 1783-1802," pp. 127-131. The Hon. J. W. Fortescue.

It was not until 1806, twenty-eight years after this action, that we see the British light infantry at the battle of Maida repeating, with a glamour of their old glory, the American tactics; and twenty years of the twenty-eight intervening were certainly the most dismal in the annals of the British Army. When politicians attempt to lead armies, then indeed is the old saying true, "Facilis est descensus Averni !"