British Light Infantry in the 18th Century

When, on the continent of Europe, men of education and profession, as well as historians and philosophers, were looking with anxiety upon the changing times. In 1789, the Empress Catharine said to Segur: "Croyez moi, une guerre seule peut changer la direction des esprits en France, les reunir, donner un but plus utile aux passions et reveiller le vrai patriotisme." "Segur" III., 242. There were many others besides the clear-sighted Catharine who thought likewise. And when the Rights of Man, and, consequently, the destruction of liberty, were permeating the lowest strata of society, the politicians of England, having partially disbanded their war-trained army, set to work, in a manner which for skilfulness and thoroughness must command the admiration of all true iconoclasts, to destroy the remainder of this force by rendering it unamenable to discipline, by corrupting its corps of officers and by filling its ranks with the clearings of the gaols - pickpockets, coiners, thieves and vagabonds.

If there ever has been an object lesson of the danger of entrusting an army to civil control, this lesson can be read in the history of the British Army between the years 1784 and 1798.

In 1784, General Conway retired from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the army, and, for political reasons, no other officer was appointed in his place. From this time on the decadence was rapid, and, in 1794, we find the condition of the army truly deplorable.

“Hard drinking," writes Fortescue, "which was the fashion then in all classes from highest to lowest, was, of course, sedulously cultivated by these aspirants to the rank of gentlemen; and it was no uncommon thing for regiments to start on the march under charge of the Adjutant and Sergeant-Major only, while the officers stayed behind, to come galloping up several hours later, full of wine, careless where they rode, careless of the confusion into which they threw the columns, careless of everything but the place appointed for the end of the march, if by chance they were sober enough to have remembered it. These evils, too, were extremely difficult to check, for in 1794, as in 1744, political interest rather than meritorious service was the road to promotion. While the shameful traffic of the army-brokers and the raising of endless new regiments continued, every officer who could command money or interest was sure of obtaining advancement at home without the knowledge of his chief in the field, and had, therefore, not only no encouragement to do his duty, but an actual reason for avoiding it. Thus the men were very imperfectly disciplined; there were no efficient company officers to look after them; no efficient Colonels to look after the company officers; no Generals to look after the Colonels." "History of the British Army," Vol. IV., p. 297. Hon. J. W. Fortescue.

Charles Dupin in his "View of the History and Actual State of the Military Force of Great Britain," 1820, writes: In 1804 "who could believe that a youth under sixteen years of age, to whom the civil law denies the right of purchasing, or disposing of the least real estate, can, for ever, alienate the property of his own person? A child may sell himself, or rather be sold by his parents, for life, and the difference between the price of enlistment for limited or unlimited service is only one guinea! When the parents or tutors of a youth under sixteen years of age induce him to enlist for life they receive a reward of two guineas . . .!"

As no proper system of recruiting or registration existed, the men, having been disbanded, were not so easily obtained when once again they were required. In spite of the shortage of supply, the demand steadily increased, and every fraudulent measure imaginable was legalised in order to obtain men. In this respect the administration of William Pitt entirely eclipses all efforts of maladministration of the army by any civilian prior to his day; further it has never been equalled by any since, and this is indeed saying much. The British Army, in 1792, consisted of 32,000 men in the British Isles and a similar force in the East Indies maintained by the East India Company; besides these forces there were thirty-six regiments of yeomanry. In 1796, it consisted of 206,000 men, including 42,000 militia. More than half of this force, however, was required for service in the colonies. "History of Europe," Vol. Ill., p. 105. Sir Archibald Alison.

In 1794, to obtain recruits, Pitt introduced the rascally system of raising men for rank; in other words, officers could buy their promotion not merely by paying for it, but by buying men as recruits for the army, certain standards being set down according to the rank to be bought. The result was that "undesirable characters, such as keepers of gambling-houses, contrived to buy for their sons the command of regiments, and mere children were exalted in the course of a few weeks to the dignity of field-officers. One proud parent, indeed, requested leave of absence for one of these infant Lieutenant-Colonels on the ground that he was not yet fit to be taken from school." "History of the British Army," Vol. IV., p. 213. Hon. J. W. Fortescue. Alison in his "History of Europe," Vol. III., p. 106, writes: "To such a length was this system carried, that it was not unusual for infants to obtain commissions in the cradle, and draw pay regularly for sixteen years before they joined their corps. The well-known story in Scotland when a loud noise was heard in the nursery, 'Oh, it's only the Major roaring for his Parritch!' shows how common this abuse had become in families of influence." Charles Napier, in a letter to his mother, written on December 26th 1803, pens a striking picture of the decrepit old general of. his day. ". . . Under a long feather and cocked hat, trembling, though supported by stiff Hessian boots, goldheaded cane and long sword, I see the wizened face of a general grinning over the parapet of a fine frill, and telling extraordinary lies, while his claret, if he can afford claret, is going down the throats of his wondering or quizzing aides-de-camp."

Ranks were filled by the press-gangs; "recruiting became a mere matter of gambling; the price of men rose to thirty pounds a head. . . . Pitt's behaviour showed both callousness and ignorance." "History of the British Army, " Vol. IV., p. 214 Hon. J. W. Fortescue.

Once the men had been captured, there existed no system of instruction, except the Principles of Dundas, which were so complex that they required years and years of teaching. The officers took little or no interest in their profession, the money they had spent in buying men was so much capital sunk, the interest of which was their pay. They had no stake in the army as a military force; to them it was solely a commercial concern, and a means of gaining the veneer of aristocratic distinction as well as a gaudy uniform to attract the female eye.

When no more recruits were forthcoming, Pitt, in place of turning those he had collected from a rabble of discontented ruffians into some semblance of a fighting force, resorted to hiring mercenaries. He left the British soldier to starve, and paid £36,000 to the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel for twelve thousand Hessians at call. "It was literally true," writes Fortescue, "that by the end of 1794 the old British army had been destroyed, both officers and men. . . . It was not Austerlitz that killed Pitt," but "the burden of his incapacity for war." "The British Army, 1783-1802," pp. 30 and 54. Hon. J. W. Fortescue.

In Ireland matters reached a climax in 1798, when Abercromby published his famous "General Order" of February 26: "The very disgraceful frequency of courts-martial and the many complaints of irregularities in the conduct of the troops in the kingdom have, too, unfortunately proved the army to be in a sfate of licentiousness which must render it formidable to every one but the enemy."

In the same year Cornwallis disbanded the Perthshire Fencibles in Ireland on account of the insubordination of its officers.

This appalling want of discipline throughout the British Army was due, as Fortescue points out, to one main fact, and only one: "The encroachments of the civil head of the War Office upon the province of the Commander-in-Chief." "History of the British Army," Vol. IV., p. 878. Hon. J. W. Fortescue.

THE DUKE OF YORK

In 1795, most fortunately for the army, the personality of the Duke of York began to assert itself. Chiefly remembered on account of the disastrous Walcheren Expedition, it is customary, for those who do not read history, to scoff at him; and many have passed by his statue and wondered why it was erected and what entitled him to a column as towering as that of Lord Nelson. What he did was this: by introducing reforms into an army, reduced to a mob of armed men by political intrigue and civilian mismanagement, he rendered it possible, a few years later, for Wellington to win a score of victories in the Peninsula of Spain, and ultimately, with the aid of Blücher, to defeat Napoleon at Waterloo. Nelson, with a fine navy, destroyed a numerically superior fleet. The Duke of York recreated, from a criminal rabble, supported by corrupt politicians, an unconquerable army. With justice, both deserve the stones upon which their effigies are raised.

It was not long before the Duke of York's influence was felt. We find the question of educating the officer brought to the fore, and, in March 1799, a military school was opened for the instruction of Staff Officers at High Wycombe, under the guidance of M. de Jarry, a professor from the Military School of Berlin. In after years this school became known as the Staff College. In 1802, the Royal Military College was opened at Great Marlow. In 1795, the Duke of York "took over a number of undisciplined and disorganised regiments, filled for the most part with the worst stamp of man and officer, and that in less than seven years he converted these unpromising elements into an army" Ibid, Vol. IV., p. 929. This remark is reminiscent of a saying of Confucius: The Master said: "To lead an uninstructed people to war is to throw them away." The Master said: "Let a good man teach the people seven years, and they may then likewise be employed in war." "The Chinese Classics," Vol. I., p. 207. James Legge.

The very incompetence and corruption of the politicians was producing a back-wash of indignation in the mind of all upright men; and the new school of military discipline, the school of Wade, Wolfe, Amherst, Bouquet and others, not entirely suffocated, was released, by the able administration of the Duke of York, from a position which would have ultimately succeeded in throttling it.

In the navy, Collingwood, "who was charged with the training of all the most dangerous seamen at a most dangerous time accomplished it practically without the use of the lash - a marvellous achievement which is partially explained by the fact that under his rules of discipline, officers were obliged to address the men with civility."

Charles Stuart and Abercromby were the soldiers who approached him most closely. St. Vincent, Nelson, Collingwood, "all alike were nearly as proud of an empty sick-bay as of a victory." In the army, Charles Grey, Ralph Abercromby, Charles Stuart, John Moore and Thomas Maitland ". . . possessed that peculiar thoughtfulness for the soldiers' comfort, which loses no opportunity of staving off from him avoidable hardship and privation. . . ."

". . . Hitherto soldiers in the field had been treated in the War Office as mere cyphers. After an action a return of killed and wounded was indeed sent in, but it contained only the number, not the names of the fallen. In 1799, however, four Colonels who had ventured to furnish so bald a statement were sharply rebuked by the Commander-in-Chief for their neglect, and the names of the dead were required of them for the sake of the widows and orphans." "History of the British Army," Vol. IV., p. 927. Hon. J. W. Fortescue.

On June 9, 1801, the Duke of York was appointed Commander-in-Chief in Great Britain and Ireland, and from this date he assumed absolute control of the military side of the War Office. The result was electrical - a steady current of reform at once set in, revitalising an army dead to discipline, efficiency, confidence and honour.