British Light Infantry in the 18th Century

I have already mentioned that on the return of the British Army from America, the light infantry tactics, which, during the war, it had been forced to adopt, met with scant favour from those officers who had remained at home and whose imagination was not elastic enough to stretch itself beyond the vista of the geometric evolutions of a Horse Guards parade. I have also mentioned that the severest critic of the two-deep line and the loose order of warfare was Colonel David Dundas, who was, in 1789, serving on the Headquarter Staff at Dublin.

Dundas had been trained in the old school; he was a level-headed Scotsman, but a man of small imagination. In 1785, he attended the last manoeuvres held by Frederick the Great and was so struck by the shoulder-to-shoulder formations, the flexible columns, the deploying battalions, and the minute precision and accuracy of the whole Prussian Army, that in order to stimulate, or rather to resuscitate, ideas already growing old, he, three years later, in 1788, produced an elaborate work dealing with the Prussian drill. This work was entitled the "Principles of Military Movements Chiefly Applied to Infantry." Cornwallis, fresh from America, was also present at these manoeuvres, and it is interesting to compare the opinions of this war-trained soldier with those of Dundas, the peace theorist. Cornwallis writes: "Their manoeuvres were such as the worst General in England would be hooted at for practising - two long lines coming up within six yards of one another and firing until they had no ammunition left; nothing could be more ridiculous." "Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis," Vol. I, p. 212.

Dundas was not exactly a great man, but his influence on the British Army was, in spite of his incapability to grasp the principles of war, an exceedingly beneficial one, more so than that of many a greater man before his time and since. His one virtue was thoroughness, a virtue the times sadly lacked. He produced his celebrated work at a period when any work of a serious nature, however narrow might be the views contained in it, could not otherwise but act as a tonic to revive an appetite for things military in Great Britain, which had become utterly jaded by the military debauch of the last ten years. Most of the war trained soldiers had been either disbanded or had become utterly demoralised. The old rigid discipline had broken down, and the new well-jointed discipline, brought to life by the American War, was entirely dissipated by want of direction, want of condensation and want of control. Dundas saw a mob of men in place of an army - a drunken, besotted set of ruffians in place of a well-drilled soldiery. No wonder then that he, not being able to see beyond the political horizon, was unable to appreciate the fact that this rabble had once been an army of capable soldiers. In his mind there was only one remedy in order to counteract this want of discipline which he considered was the result of the American War, and that was drill; and there can be no doubt that in the year 1789 he was perfectly right; drill alone could restore discipline to the army. He did not, however, see that once this discipline, based on drill, had differentiated the soldier from the civilian, a further discipline should be sought, namely, a discipline based on affection, intelligence and skill. He did not see that drill should be simple as well as severe, and that it should prepare the soldier for all types of war and not for any one patent system of tactics. Nevertheless, at this juncture, his "Principles" were a veritable godsend, for they gave officers and men alike something definite to learn.

It has often been asserted that prior to the appearance of "The Principles of Military Movements," there was no fixed system of drill in the British Army. This assertion is only partially correct, for, as a matter of fact, various official drill-books had been in use since the earliest days of the Standing Army. Many of these still exist, such as those of 1690, 1728, 1739, 1758; but, from the time of the Seven Years' War to the days of Dundas, official works on drill seem to have been little used, perhaps because the drill of Frederick the Great was so firmly grounded that it was not considered necessary to publish a revised edition of the 1758 drill-book; perhaps also because, from 1758 on to 1775, the British Army saw no service in Europe. But, by 1783, there can be no doubt that the old drill had broken down, that it was not fully taught, and that, from that date on, there being no official manual based on the lessons of the American War, officers drilled, or more frequently neglected to drill, their units according to their own particular fancies. It was, therefore, quite time that some work should be published upon which the army, as a whole, might be trained, otherwise co-operation between units would soon become impossible through each unit learning a different variety of drill.

THE PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS

"The Principles of Military Movements" deserve consideration, for not only do they, in a way, resemble Guibert's "Essay on Tactics," but they mark a definite change in the history of the British Standing Army. In France, Guibert had been accused of decrying the use of light infantry as suggested by Mesnil-Durand, de Broglie and others; but what he really opposed was the raising of irregulars under the title of light infantry. Guibert was a tactician of great merit; Dundas was only a drill-master. Nevertheless, on glancing at the "Principles of Military Movements," we find that Dundas' chief objection to light infantry lay in its irregular employment. He advocated light infantry battalions in place of improvised corps.

Basing his book on the "invaluable work of General von Saldern" and his own experiences gained at the Prussian manoeuvres of 1785, he states in his Preface that, at the date of his writing, there was no system in the British Army which regulated or connected "the joint exertions of battalions." Further, he writes, and with a certain amount of truth, that "the very small proportion of cavalry employed in the American wars has much tended to introduce the present loose and irregular system of our infantry."

Turning to light infantry he says: "The importance also which the light infantry have acquired has more particularly tended to establish this practice (i.e., loose order.) During the late war, their service was conspicuous, and their gallantry and exertions have met with merited applause. But instead of being considered as an accessory to the battalion, they have become the principle feature of our army, and have almost put grenadiers out of fashion. The showy exercise, the airy dress, the independent modes which they have adopted, have caught the minds of young officers, and made them imagine that these ought to be general and exclusive. The battalions, constantly drained of their best men, have been taught to undervalue themselves, almost to forget that on their steadiness and efforts the decision of events depends, and that light infantry, Jaegers, marksmen, riflemen, etc., etc., vanish before the solid movements of the line . . ." "Principles of Military Movements," pp. 12, 13, Colonel David Dundas. 1788.

In this we see much that is sound. The idea then prevalent of looking on the battalion as the recruiting ground of its light company was radically wrong; it did not tend to efficiency in the light company and most certainly not in the battalion. When war broke out, the more highly trained flank companies were usually brigaded and formed into separate light battalions, and the remaining companies which, in 1788, were little better than a rabble, were left to the battalion commander to do what he could with. Dundas's statement that the decision of the battle depends on the heavy infantry or grenadiers is essentially correct. His mistake was that whilst in his book he sets forth an elaborate, far too elaborate, system of infantry drill, he all but entirely neglects the training of light infantry which he nevertheless considered a necessary accessory to the battalion.

Further on, he points out that all European armies use light infantry, but that their light infantry form separate corps; that their skirmishers work in order and are always supported by a "firm reserve"; that their attacks are connected, and, that unless they are so, the light infantry scattered in front prevent the proper use of artillery. This undoubtedly was often the case, as is well exemplified during the later battles of Napoleon when he replaced the act of demoralisation as wrought by the skirmishers by an overwhelming fire from massed guns.

Dundas opposed the two-deep formation, and here he made a radical mistake; for depth of formation depended then, as now, on fire effect, and the fire effect of the three-deep line had again and again proved itself to be negligible.

The "Principles of Military Movements" were very well received in London. The Duke of York approved of them, and, in order to introduce a fixed system of drill, Dundas received a royal command to embody his "Principles" in a volume suitable as a textbook for the British forces in England, India and the Colonies. This he did, and on June 1st, 1792, was published the first edition of the "Rules and Regulations for the Formations, Field Exercise and Movements of His Majesty's Forces."

There was, however, so much that was rigid, formal and unnecessary in Dundas's drill, that it gained for him the nickname of 'Old Pivot,' while he also made the fatal mistake of distributing the whole science of military evolution into eighteen manoeuvres, which were a sad stumbling-block to slow-witted officers. 'General,' said Sir John Moore to him in 1804, 'that book of yours has done a great deal of good, and would be of great value if it were not for those damned eighteen manoeuvres.' 'Why-ay,' answered Dundas slowly in broad Scotch, blockheads don't understand.' " "Narratives of Some Passages in the Great War with France, from 1799-1810," p. 46. By Lieut.-General Sir Henry Bunbury, K.C.B. 1854.

"THE RULES AND REGULATIONS"

The first edition of "The Rules and Regulations" is well worth a brief survey, for on this work have been based the various drill-books published from that day to the present.

The book consists of 458 quarto pages. It is divided into four parts.

Part 1. deals with the training of the recruits; first, without arms, and secondly, with arms.

Part II. with the platoon or company, the platoon falling in in three ranks.

Part III. with the battalion, and Part IV., entirely with the line.

In Part III., pages 332 to 341 deal with light infantry, in a very brief and elementary way. Open order was to be at two-feet interval. Files may extend from the right, left or centre. When the light company is not extended all firing is to be by single men (that is independent firing). When extended, the two men of the same file are never to be unloaded in advancing and retiring. All movements were to take place in quick time (108 paces to the minute.) Light companies were never to run unless ordered; the intermixture of files can never be allowed." Advantage of ground must be taken but light companies must never be dispersed. In situations of defence the men must cover themselves by means of "trees, walls, large stones." . . . "The arms of light infantry in general will be carried sloped, and with bayonets fixed." The light infantry company was to be divided into two divisions and posted in rear of the flanks of the battalion, so that, when ordered to cover the front, they could move outwards round the flanks.

All this is laid down on pages 332 to 336.

On page 338 we read that when light infantry companies are formed into a battalion they are to act like any ordinary battalion; and on page 339, that "a battalion of light infantry may occasionally be ordered to run . . . running must generally be in column." When acting in battalion, light infantry must be careful to co-operate with the line.

Such are the first official regulations on the movements of light infantry. They are, indeed, scanty, nevertheless they constitute a beginning, and as such they form a conspicuous landmark in the history of British light infantry.