British Light Infantry in the 18th Century

Since the close of the American War of Independence, the question of raising a New Army based on the experiences of this war had exercised the minds of many thinking Englishmen, and none more so than that of Major-General John Money, who, as early as 1775, offered to raise a body of light infantry, persuaded, as he was of their value, by having watched the Jaegers in the woods of Westphalia during the latter part of the Seven Years' War. "I gave my proposition to Lord Barrington," he writes. "It was to have consisted of two troops of Chasseurs a Cheval and 600 Riflemen. It was not approved of, but a corps was raised by General Tarleton, in America, somewhat similar to it. . . ."

In 1781, when Sir Charles Hardy's fleet retired to Spithead, before the combined forces of the enemy and an invasion of this country was imminent, Money wrote an anonymous pamphlet which was published by Egerton, the army publishers, in which he stated that "our Cavalry was but the pageantry of the state, and not such as were required to act in an inclosed country. . . ." To remedy the matter, he proposed a dual training for the cavalry: first, that they should be trained to act in squadrons, that is as cavalry pure and simple; secondly, to organise the cavalry so that they might be made "dismountable in short legions." Further, he proposed to add to them chasseurs and light artillery, for such additions he asserts "would give a small body of Cavalry a great advantage over a large." The contents of this pamphlet are given on pp. 7 to 22 of his 1799 open letter to the Hon. William Windham. This was "Weathercock" Windham, the Secretary-of-War.

In 1792, he wrote a history of the campaign of that year in which he compared the well-trained chasseurs of the continental powers to the ill-trained light infantry of the British Army, and none too favourably. A few years later, in 1798, he wrote a small work entitled, "Observations on the use of Chasseurs," and apparently, as this work was scouted by the authorities, in the following year he addressed to the Honourable William Windham an open letter entitled, "On a Partial Reorganisation of the British Army." This letter was published by Egerton in pamphlet form, and embodies, according to his own statement, most of the views expressed by him in 1781 and 1798. From this book all the following quotations have been taken.

General Money was an officer of considerable experience. By 1799 he had served for forty years in the British Army, having first seen active service during the Seven Years War, and for the whole of this time he had maintained that in an enclosed country such as Westphalia, Flanders or Kent, light troops were an essential to success. His chief fault seems to have been his honest indignation at the thickheadedness of the military authorities. On page 37 he writes: "And what should prevent your being organised as I advise? Why, Sir, old Jack-boot prejudices, which no argument, I fear, or example will remove. Before, Sir, the German War, there was not a single Light Dragoon in the British service; now we have little else, and we have not a single regiment of Chasseurs in our Army, yet I have no doubt that in a few years you will see many."

Money's words were prophetic. Four years later Sir John Moore formed his School at Shorncliffe; six years later still the British Army was given the two-rank formation.

Money's arguments are irrefutable, being based on experience and history. He points out that chasseurs are to be met with in every service in Europe except the British. "The Austrians have many Regiments of them," he writes; "the Prussians have them attached in a certain proportion to each corps; but the French, seeing the good effect of these Irregulars, have brought them more into the field than all the Combined Powers together; and I will venture to say, that in a country similar to Kent, the army supported best by Irregulars, properly armed and clothed, will carry their point whatever it may be" (p. 9.)

That this defect in the British service was not due to British character, but to the opacity of the British generals and politicians, Money clearly emphasises. The mere fact of the British being a free people, Money asserts, is sufficient to constitute them, if well-trained, good chasseurs; but of all men, he considered the Highlanders would make the best, "as they are a hardy, nimble, and an intelligent people" (p. 45.) The conservatism of the nation, however, stood in his way and delayed this essential reform. The country at large did not even know what was meant by a chasseur. "What is a Chasseur?" they ask. "What is his duty? If they had been called Irregulars or Riflemen, the same question would have been asked" (p. 23.) The bayonet was considered the national weapon, consequently what had been good enough for their fathers was good enough for them. But, as Money asserts, and very truly too, "powder and ball must decide the fate of the day," and then he sarcastically adds, "not forgetting a little military skill " (p. 15).

As countries become enclosed, so, Money points out, light infantry become more and more necessary, and replace cavalry. As an example he shows how the country round Lisle (Lille) in the days of the Duke of Marlborough was open land, but that a hundred years of growth rendered it quite unsuitable to cavalry movements and to infantry in mass formation. He then points out that England is "infinitely more strongly inclosed than Flanders," and adds, "we have above 40,000 Cavalry in this country, and not a single troop of them trained or properly armed to dismount" (p. 35). That even when dismounted the cavalryman cannot compete with the chasseur. He quotes in support a contemporary work entitled, "Instructions for Hussars and Cavalry," in which the author states: "that if you have in your front nothing but defiles and woods, Cavalry is absolutely useless; if there be a defile or wood which is absolutely necessary to pass through, you must make your Infantry come on, and order your Cavalry to remain in the open country " (p. 34).

Again he writes: "I will put one or two questions to Military Men which I am persuaded they must answer in the affirmative. Is there between London and Harwich, or Ipswich, any ground on which three squadrons of horse can form, without being in reach of musketry from the hedgerows on their front and flanks ? Of what use then, in God's name, is Cavalry, where they cannot form to charge, for if they cannot form they cannot charge. Will any Officer of Cavalry tell me he can enter a field of ten or twelve acres (few larger on either side the great road) when the opposite hedgerows are lined with Infantry? No matter whether Chasseurs or any other Infantry: he certainly could not, let his bravery be what it would, for his men, when fired upon, would run back to the gate they entered, faster than they came in.

"Much has been said of our national weapon, as it is called, the bayonet. Let us see what effect that would have on a similar occasion, if they had an enemy to force, posted as I have described them. Before half your men are entered to form and charge, those who were not killed or wounded would either rush forward with fixed bayonets, or rush backwards; if the former, the field would soon be strewed with dead men - it would be another Bunker's Hill. What then is to be done, may be asked, since you will not allow that our Cavalry can act in such case, nor our Infantry charge with a prospect of success? Nothing, Sir, so plain; nothing so evident; meet them as you ought with men armed and trained, to dispute hedgerow after hedgerow; then whichever army has the best Chasseurs (supposing numbers equal) will prevail of course; those who have the most, will not fail of succeeding, judiciously disposed of" (pp. 38, 39.)

Kent, he points out, forms an ideal fighting country for the irregular. "An army destined to make war in America should be composed one half of Irregulars, and in the county of Kent not less than one-fifth ought to be trained, armed, clothed and disciplined as Chasseurs . . ." (p. 17). And again: "I make no scruple of declaring that not less than 3,000 Chasseurs are wanted in Kent to meet troops of that description, which the enemy will undoubtedy bring over, if they come; and as many are wanted in Essex, which is equally as inclosed" (p. 18).

ENCLOSED COUNTRIES REQUIRE INDIVIDUAL TACTICS

To convince his readers, General Money corroborates and supports his theories by incidents drawn from history.

"To the American War," he writes, "I look with a heavy heart for examples of the great use of Irregulars, for what was the army that captured General Burgoyne's but an army of Irregulars? What other appellation can be given to Militia untrained? . . . At Saratoga the finest army in the world, as to numbers, laid down their arms, to what Mr. Rigby in the House of Commons called an 'undisciplined rabble': but they were all Woodsmen, that is, marksmen" (p. 16.) Had the army of Burgoyne in it a thousand well-trained Chasseurs, so an old Colonel in one of General Burgoyne's regiments told General Money, "that army would not have been lost" (p. 23).

In America the French learnt the great use of Irregulars; "there they perceived the undisciplined peasantry holding in check the best-dressed regiments in the British service, when once they had possessed themselves of a wood; there they were confirmed in the report, that the raw peasants of the country on Bunker's Hill, killed and wounded, out of 2,000, no less than 1,054 British officers and soldiers" (p. 21.)

The French were not slow to learn the lesson the American backwoodsmen set them. To illustrate this he quoted Baron de Pomps' "History of the Campaign of 1796," in which the theatre of war in Italy is described as follows: " '. . . The valleys which separate the hills are covered with mulberry-trees and vines, planted in hedgerows, or in arbours, forming narrow covered ways, which must be forced one after the other by the soldier; the roads are defiles, lined with walls and are nevertheless the only places where the cavalry can act.' And in what part of England is it, where an enemy is likely ever to be engaged, that will admit of Cavalry charging but on our turnpike-roads? . . . The author proceeds: 'In the Italian Tyrol, a battalion can never march and attack in front; as soon as it advances to the enemy, it must be scattered about as Tirailleurs; then each man must act for himself, and consider himself alone as a small Army. I was much pleased in meeting with this book which I did last summer, after my publication on the use of Chasseurs, for this coincides perfectly with what I have written on the subject. And what follows is the same. 'He must advance with rapidity when he is supported, and retire in the same manner when he is not; he must fire a propos, then put himself under cover; he must call his companions when he has found a good pass. . . .' What kind of war does the author mean? Can there be a doubt upon it? A war in an inclosed country, to be sure, where a battalion cannot march and attack in front where the inclosures are so small as to be within musket shot of the hedgerow in his front; where Cavalry cannot charge but on great roads, such as this country is. It is for this reason therefore, Sir, I contend (and shall, till I am childish) that we must be reorganised to fight the enemy on equal terms. The author proceeds: 'All new methods have succeeded in war, from the Macedonian phalanx to the tactic of Frederic. The French owe a great part of their successes to the new mode of fighting which they have adopted; they precipitate themselves like a swarm of wasps on all the points they desire to force; young Generals put themselves at their head, and share their dangers ' " (pp. 45-8). Money's criticism of the French temperament is interesting. "I know the French well," he writes. "I have seen them in action, and have commanded them. It is true they charge like tigers, when elated with a prospect of success; but they run like sheep when they are beaten, or likely to be beaten" (p. 55).

Money further points out how our disasters in Flanders were solely due to the fact that we could not meet the French Chasseur: ". . . From the moment we commenced our sad retreat from Tournay, till we arrived near Breda, nothing was to be seen but the enemy's Irregular Troops; this was owing to our having only small bodies of Irregulars to meet large ones, and to the countries being inclosed, which favoured their operations.

"To this cause, and no other, may be ascribed all our disasters in West Flanders, viz., a deficiency in Light Troops, and of that particular description called by the French Chasseurs a pied, and Chasseurs a cheval " (p. 19).

In another place he writes: "What was termed in this country the advancing en masse, by the French, was nothing more than very large bodies of Irregulars, which covered the country, in the front of their Armies, like an inundation. To their Irregulars, and to their Light Artillery, are the French indebted for most of the victories they gained" (p. 8.)

GENERAL MONEY'S PROPOSED REFORMS

Money's proposed reforms are scattered throughout his work, but by collecting them in some form we arrive at the following:

First, an army must have good generals (p. 33). "A General who wishes to have the confidence of his men, which every General ought to desire, he should upon all occasions convince them that he will never wantonly throw away the life of a single soldier; and he who cautiously takes them into fire, and prudently withdraws them out of it when he sees no more good is to be done, that General will soon have the confidence of his men" (p. 24.)

Secondly, training men means instilling confidence. To men who have been treated with severity when in health and with little humanity when ill, he justly remarks: "How trifling must such men's concern be, whether an enterprise succeeds or fails!" Quoting Baron de Pomps, he continues: "He is left to all the horrors of his profession; the idea of killing or being killed is constantly present to his mind, naked and unqualified; it is never disguised by the enthusiasm of honour.' What are such soldiers fit for? Why, Sir, to be fixtures only in garrisons, or like the forty-eight-pounders on the ramparts, never to be removed from them. But in actions, Sir, where animation, where the exercise of the faculties of the mind are called for, he is useless " (p. 49).

Thirdly, to obtain confidence it is necessary to possess skill. The British soldiers in America "were sensible, they were not a match for the enemy's Riflemen in the woods." There, he asserts, it was a contest between "high-dressed corps and corps of skilful marksmen. Seldom were the American's Riflemen seen, the report of his gun you heard, but his ball was felt" (p. 26). "Men who feel themselves cyphers where there is danger, will not long continue in it." It is, therefore, necessary to cement all these ciphers together by mutual confidence (p. 32). Musketry must be systematically taught, and all chasseurs should be armed with a rifle.

Abroad, he writes, "the men are taught never to waste a shot, and whenever they do fire, it rarely happens but a man is killed or wounded; they are taught to conceal themselves as much as possible; to creep from bush to bush, and if pressed to run off, for retrograde motions are not deemed disgraceful to Chasseurs; in short, a true Irregular is, or ought to be, in every respect an Indian, except in scalping. A Light Infantryman fires where he sees smoke, and continues firing till he has wasted all his ammunition. This is nine times out of ten the case. All this proceeds from his not being trained as a marksman, for if he were, he never would think of venturing a shot but at some determined object. When a Light Infantryman hears a ball pass him, which he has the good luck of having escaped, he turns directly to the quarter from which the shot appears to come and fires at random, instead of concealing himself, as a Rifleman would do, and looking for the man that fired at him. This proceeds solely from a want of confidence in his own skill; and the same want of confidence may make him quit his post. A man who trusts not in the arms he fights with, or in his own skill, must feel himself half beat" (pp. 10, 11.)

Fourthly, confidence in one's physical powers is as necessary as confidence in one's weapons. "I have seen Indians in fire," he writes, "and am persuaded that fifty of them would kill or take two hundred men of any high-dressed regiment in Europe who had fifty miles to march in a woody or an extremely inclosed country. To support this opinion I would refer my reader to the accounts given of General Braddock's surprise, and total defeat, June 9th, 1755. This shows that Chasseurs ought to be brought as near the Indian as possible, and have nothing to carry when action is expected but a powder-horn and a bag of loose balls; they ought to be able to run twelve miles in two hours, which any well-made young athletic man could easily be brought to in a fortnight, for there is no better material in the world for Irregulars than in this island" (p. 22).

Fifthly, a chasseur or light infantryman must be suitably clothed and equipped; on this subject General Money's remarks are eminently practical. They are as follows: "The consideration of this article has been stated as futile, and as not worthy of attention; a brave man will, it has been said, fight well in any coat. No doubt of it; but the plain question is, whether your men, who are to be exposed to the enemy's experienced marksmen, should be clothed in a colour so conspicuous as to render every movement you make obvious to an enemy? Or whether any other colour would better tend to conceal your movements, and so save your men? Surely every General Officer would be glad to conceal his movements from the enemy, and surely it is the duty, as well as it must be the inclination, of every General to save his men, and not expend them but in cases of absolute necessity. A sentry becomes, in a scarlet coat, a complete target to Riflemen. A grand guard, or any advanced post in scarlet, are easily distinguished, and their numbers clearly ascertained at a great distance, even if they are posted in a wood; on the contrary, if they are clothed in green, or dark brown, they are not discernible, but at a very short distance. Patrols have received a fire from, and been very near sentries and corps in green, when they have imagined an enemy was not near them by many miles. Not only the scarlet coat, which is the clothing of our Light Infantry, but their white accoutrements, may be objected to for the same reason; they ought to be black. Their arms should not be bright, nor any glittering ornaments, no plumes of feathers, should appear on men destined to be employed on the advanced posts of an Army, particularly in an inclosed country. The Austrians are in dark grey; the French mostly in green; the Infanterie Legere in grey or mixed colour. In Canada, during the American War, we had two companies of Woodsmen in dark brown, nearly the colour of the bark of trees, which in that country was decidedly the most eligible" (pp. 11, 12). These observations were first published in 1798.

GENERAL MONEY'S PROPOSED REORGANISATION

At the end of his open letter he sets forth clearly under seven headings his proposals as to the reorganisation of the British Army.

"Firstly, that one half of the regiments of Light Dragoons in the British service be immediately formed into legions, the cavalry part of the legion to be Horse Chasseurs, that is dismountable Dragoons (i.e., Mounted Infantry,) the eight troops of each regiment, which now consists of eighty men per troop, to be reduced to seventy-two per troop. The Cavalry of the legion will then be 580; these to be clothed, trained, and armed as Horse Chasseurs, with a short musket, such as the French use, called mousqueton, of half-inch bore, a perfect cylinder barrel, made expressly for carrying ball true.

"Secondly, that three companies be raised, or drafted from other regiments, each company to consist of 60 men; these, with the 60 that will remain of the Cavalry reduced in number, will make a small corps of 240 Chasseurs à foot, to act and co-operate with those mounted, as occasion may require.

"Thirdly, that to this legion be attached two pieces of Light Artillery, not of less calibre than a four-pounder, which is the size of the French battalion guns; for it is of the greatest importance in an action in an open country (in which such corps are as well calculated to act as in an inclosed one) that you have with you, or at hand, artillery equal to that which you may suppose the enemy to have, and what may fairly be deemed open country, is where there is a space of one English mile between hedgerow and hedgerow, or inclosures of any kind, through which Cavalry cannot charge. When Light Troops meet in such a country, then it is that the guns which carry farthest, will give that party to which they belong the command of the intermediate ground between the two hostile corps, and that artillery which is superior will, if well managed, always force the other party to retire, and sometimes oblige them to abandon their guns. If you are superior, you have then an opportunity of not only forming your Cavalry on the open ground, but to bring infantry forward also, under the cover of your guns and protection of your Cavalry. Enough has already been said on this subject; any Cavalry officer, when he has seen a little service, will soon know what use to make of his artillery and Chasseurs.

"Fourthly, that two Lieutenants of the legion be sent to Woolwich for a few weeks to learn Field Engineering; also, two non-commissioned officers of each troop and company, there to be taught the exercise of the guns, etc.

"Fifthly, that all the Yeomanry Cavalry in England and Scotland be made dismountable, and be trained and clothed as Horse Chasseurs, or have either a rifle or musketoon given them; they then may be brought into action in a manner to do essential service, should this country ever be fought for; but as they now are, should such a day arrive, they will (I must repeat it) be found more an incumbrance than of use. Country gentlemen will excuse this remark on their present organisation; they are not indeed now competent even to force a market town in possession of a mob armed with scythes and pitchforks, with the avenues leading to it blocked up with carts and waggons. A proposal is here offered for their being armed and clothed in such a manner as to be able to render their king and country as much service as their zeal and ardour may inspire.

"Sixthly, that one-fifth of the Infantry of the line be immediately formed into regiments of Chasseurs, by drafting out of them every man not fit for service, and completing them from the Light Infantry of other regiments, and by giving leave for the Light Infantry of the Militia to enlist into these regiments, without filling up their vacancies by a fresh draft on their respective parishes. By doing this, Government will be enabled to send out a fifth of every detachment of Chasseurs when it is probable they may come in contact with the enemy; and to the West Indies a still larger proportion ought to be sent of troops of that description.

"Seventhly, that half the Supplementary Militia, which is a quarter of the whole, be armed, clothed, and trained as Chasseurs. When all this is done, Sir, you need not fear an invasion, or meeting the enemy in any part of Europe" (pp. 51-4.)

All this was not done, as we may well suppose, but nevertheless the hour was approaching when men of character and common sense such as Baron de Rottenburg, Colonel Coote Manningham, the Hon. William Stewart, Lieut. Colonel Kenneth Mackenzie and Sir John Moore were going to carry out practically, at least so far as infantry were concerned, the proposals of General Money, and who, having completed their work, showed that in no way had he overstated his case. On p. 54, Money finally says that if his propositions be adopted and the British Army reorganised and reformed in accordance with the principles of war, the Republic of France may be held in check, "and I am sanguine enough to think, forced to retire back into their ancient limits." The years 1809 to 1815 proved that Money was a true prophet - true because he based his forecast on history and common sense.