British Light Infantry in the 18th Century

Born in 1774, Lieut.-Colonel Stewart was only twenty-six years old when he compiled, or helped to compile, the "Regulations of the Rifle Corps." He was a man of a high intellectual order, of exceptional insight, but he was headstrong and of an excitable temper.

In 1790, he was attached to Sir Robert Keith's mission to Vienna and European Turkey. A year later he was given the command of an independent company. In 1793, he went to the West Indies with General Grey's forces, and was Colonel of the 67th from 1795-98. Next, returning to England, he obtained leave to serve with the Austrian and Russian armies in Italy, Swabia and Switzerland, under such renowned leaders as the Archduke Charles, Suwarroff and Korsakoff. In 1800, as we have seen, he and Colonel Coote Manningham raised the Experimental Rifle Corps.

Sir William Cope, in describing the share of Stewart in the formation of the Regiment, says: "He now set himself vigorously to organise and discipline the corps thus formed at his suggestion. The Standing Orders of the Regiment, which, though issued of course in Manningham's name, were probably principally compiled by Stewart, testifying not only to his capability for organising and disciplining it, but in a most remarkable way to his pre-eminence above and beyond the military ideas of his time."

LIEUT.-COLONEL STEWART'S PROPOSED REFORMS

Through his writings we get an insight into the character of this able officer. In 1805, he published a work entitled "Outlines of a Plan for the General Reforms of the British Land Forces," in which the chief interest to us is that he bases his reforms almost entirely on moral factors and not on drill, the lash and the gibbet. Urging the, discipline of mind as well as the discipline of the body, he writes: "Subordination in an army is rendered, most perfect when authority is softened by the feelings of honour and affection, but in order to attain a full degree of vigour, it must be incorporated with the better sentiments of the heart. It has invariably been the object of great commanders to mingle authority with levity, to inspire their troops with confidence in their own capacity, to call forth their enthusiasm, and to create a common feeling between the officer and the soldier . . . without sentiments of honour or feelings of affection, all regulations, which relate to influence on the character, must ever be nugatory and useless: to these fundamental springs it seems, in fact, necessary that the whole contrivance should be adapted."

General Stewart, for by 1805 he had been promoted to the rank of Brigadier, condemned the volunteer system, which, in 1805, had reached its zenith. "There must be a total want of control," he writes, "and of that habit of mind, which progressively forms the soldier's character." Volunteering is but "to train men to a sort of mimicry of military evolutions . . ." and ". . . bravery without discipline, and without long preparation of the mind for the dreadful trade of war, will not avail . . ."

Similarly he writes of the militia: ". . . can moral qualities be created without previous cultivation, can that immovable front, that aes triplex circa pectus, so indispensable in the day of battle, be possessed without danger or hardships having ever been experienced ? . . . effective and well-disciplined forces are the best (they will ultimately be found to be the cheapest for every state), and that without the agency of these, Great Britain can never be secure at home, command dominion abroad, and far less effect that revolution in the political world which may restore Europe to any degree of equilibrium."

He wholeheartedly and fearlessly attacks the abuses of his day. He launches out against the perpetuity of service; the inadequacy of pensions and rewards; the want of fixed headquarters in each regiment; the want of promotion in the lower ranks, and the inadequacy of the pay of officers and non-commissioned officers.

"The frequent infliction of corporal punishment in our armies," he writes, "tends strongly to debase the mind, and destroy the high spirit of the soldiery . . . it deprives discipline of the influence of honour, and destroys the subordination of the heart, which can alone add voluntary zeal to the cold obligations of duty."

With reference to the officers he says: their pay not having kept a proportion with the depreciation in the value of money, has become truly inadequate; the energies of their mind, in lieu of being directed to professional duties, are too frequently exerted, in these times, to the keeping themselves free from pecuniary embarrassment, it may be advisable to increase their pay at least 20 per cent." Sir John Moore held similar views. As far as an infantry captain's pay is concerned, this reform took exactly 110 years to gestate!

These, and many other reforms, General Stewart proposed, many of which, as the years rolled on, gradually percolated through the troglodytic skull of governmental officialism. Many of these reforms, unfortunately, are still waiting for some enlightened minister to materialise in spite of a people who, though never ready for a war, are ever eager for a fight.