CHAPTER IV The Seven Years War THE MUSKET Before I examine the next great change in the history of war - the re-introduction of manoeuvre by Frederick the Great - it is, I think, necessary to appreciate the true value of the musket of this period, for, without realising its power it is difficult to understand the reason for the close formations which, characterised the armies of this day, and even the armies of as late a period as that of the Russo-Turkish War of 1878.
The extreme range of the musket was about four hundred yards. At one hundred and fifty yards, a marksman would miss a six-foot square target practically every time he fired at it. At seventy-five yards the number of hits seldom totalled fifty per cent of the rounds expended. Maurice de Saxe's opinion of collective musketry-fire was not high; he wrote in his "Reveries": "The firearm is not so terrible as one thinks; few men are killed in action by fire from the front. I have seen volleys that did not hit four men, and neither I nor anyone else saw an effect sufficient to have prevented us from continuing our advance and revenging ourselves with the bayonets and pursuing fire."
The result of this was that the "danger zone" was extremely shallow, and, consequently, could be traversed in quick time in less than five minutes. Further, loading was by the muzzle, men had to stand up to load, and once the front rank had fired, its fire had to be replaced by the rank standing behind it. All these considerations necessitated very close formations. To load and fire by successive ranks necessitated the employment of compact lines, otherwise a continuous fire could not be maintained. To cover the short "danger zone" and break the enemy's line demanded a formation which combined speed and strength; this the column provided, an attacking line being useless unless it was overwhelmingly strong or the defending line overwhelmingly stupid. To carry out an assault in column was impossible unless the line was subdivided. At the beginning of Frederick's reign no such divisions existed, for, at the end of the seventeenth century, the divisions introduced by Maurice of Nassau and Gustavus Adolphus were done away with in order to create the bar-line of linear tactics, so famous during the Turenne-Eugene-Marlborough period. Unity of line meant unity of fire, and, as a concentrated broadside of shot was the aim of the fire tactics of the day, the closer regiments could stand in line, and the more rapidly they could load, the quicker could one ponderous volley follow the other; and when the enemy adopted the same tactics, it stood to reason that the side which hurled the greatest quantity of lead at the other, in the shortest space of time, was the side which would ultimately prove victorious. This rapidity of fire depended on loading, loading on discipline and drill - mechanical drill, absolutely soulless, and carried out by word of command. Fire depended on drill, movement depended on drill, and ultimately the assault depended on drill; for, when the opposing side was sufficiently shattered, the drums would beat the charge, which was no mountain torrent of steel and muscle as at Killiecrankie, but a movement of perfect ceremony, of beautiful precision, of the most exquisite and wonderful exactitude, for Frederick's grenadiers carried out their charge at the goose-step!
Mechanical movement and implicit obedience were the two conditions aimed at by Frederick, his only mechanical invention being the iron ramrod which, facilitating the loading of the musket, helped him to win the battle of Mollwitz, in 1741. Not content with velocity of fire, he turned his attention to manouvering, so that he might mass men against the defenceless flanks of his enemy's long unjointed line. This necessitated further drill, further mechanism. "The cruelly precise drills, which are described by Frederick's aide-de-camp, Berenhorst, as rendering the Prussian soldiers 'des automates roidis.' " "Staff College Essays." Lieut. Evelyn Baring. 1870.
FREDERICK THE GREAT'S FIRE TACTICS In Frederick's day, a general brought his army from column of route into order of :battle, not after gaining information of his enemy's whereabouts, but before gaining it, such was the inverted order of tactics; and to change this order, once it had been assumed, was both a difficult and a lengthy operation. Frederick saw that, if he could manouvre sufficiently rapidly to form his order of battle after gaining exact information of his enemy's whereabouts, the advantage would always be his, and that if tactics remained what they were, he must win, in fact he could scarcely fail to do so. He determined, therefore, to divide his army into flexible divisions, and consequently re-introduced, as the tactical unit, the company, so that line formation might with rapidity be closed into column, that is, into a march formation, and column extended into line, that is, into a fighting formation. Further he introduced an elementary tactics explaining how this could be carried out in the shortest possible time.
Though Frederick made little use of light infantry from a protective point of view and none from an aggressive, it cannot, for a moment, be said that he failed to grasp the fundamental tactical principle that demoralisation by fire is the stepping stone to destruction by the bayonet; for in place of using a light infantry skirmishing line followed by heavy infantry columns, as advocated by Marshal de Saxe, he used heavy infantry (broadside fire) and artillery as the demoralising agents, followed by his superb cavalry as the agent of the shock. His troopers were armed with the sword as well as with the pistol. This fact alone raised his cavalry, under such a leader as Seydlitz, from the position of an indifferent mounted infantry to that of probably the finest cavalry to be read of since the days of Alexander. The Prussian regulations of 1727 laid down: "All squadrons shall advance to the attack with swords at the engage, standards flying, and trumpets sounding, and every commander is held bound, on his honour and reputation, to allow no shooting, but always to ride home with the sword."
Lieut.-Colonel F. N. Maude, on the rate and volume of the Prussian fire, writes: "It will be as well to analyse carefully what charging home against the Prussian infantry in those days meant. It is notorious how perfect the drill of the latter had become, but it is not so well known that the musket of the period carried an 8-bore bullet with a charge of 1 1/4 oz. of powder, which could be loaded and fired by individuals five times in one minute, and that the companies could fire at the rate of two and a half to three volleys in the same time. As the men stood three deep, and occupied two feet width in the line, that gave nine bullets for each two yards of front per volley, or thirteen bullets per yard per minute, or about the same number of bullets as the best drilled squads of Hythe, one man to the yard, can deliver in volleys at the present day. But an 8-bore spherical bullet will drop even a bison in his tracks, whereas it takes about ten modern bullets, designed on humanitarian principles, to seriously inconvenience a horse; hence no possible combination of men in line with modern rifles now could approach the stopping power of the old weapons then."
This analysis shows, more or less correctly, the great rate of fire and the enormous broadsides of lead which Frederick's troops discharged; but it entirely overdraws the picture when dealing with the stopping effect of this fire, which depended on the number of bullets which struck the enemy, and not on the number which were discharged. I have already quoted Marshal de Saxe on this point. The truth of the case is that Frederick's fire tactics were excessively clumsy, and that, in the eighteenth century, they represented what the shock tactics of the Greeks did in the days of the Macedonian phalanx. The Greeks reckoned to bring into play, during their charge, about twelve out of their sixteen ranks of pikes per yard of front ; the Prussians now reckoned on discharging about twelve bullets per yard per minute; both formations, from a purely spectacular point of view, appear to be irresistible. The truth is, however, exactly the reverse, the reason being that brute force seldom compensates for lack of skill, and as the phalanx was ultimately destroyed by a few agile swordsmen, so was the solid line of Frederick discomforted by a few skillful tirailleurs. Even if we assume Colonel Maude's analysis to be correct, it must not be forgotten that it was, and still is, utterly impossible to deliver aimed fire from platoons of men packed together like herrings in a barrel. A two foot frontage, with a modern rifle, let alone an eighteenth century firelock which weighed 16 lbs. and which when fired gave forth a jet of flame some nine inches high from its pan, would defeat all hope of accuracy. Further, the dense cloud of smoke resulting from the first discharge rendered accurate aim for subsequent volleys impossible.
Robert Jackson showed a higher grasp of fire tactics than Frederick when he wrote: "The open order is evidently the order for . . . the use of firearms; the close order, the order for the direct charge and impulse of force-bayonet or pike. This is obvious to anyone who considers things in their reasons; but, however obvious to reason the truth of the fact may be, it is doubtful in how far it has been understood and applied in practice according to principle. A volume of fire poured out from a solid line may be considered as the act of a mere machine. The machine has no distinct idea with respect to direction, consequently its act is an act at random -uncertain, and comparatively harmless. Fire, as proceeding from ranks in open order, it is reasonable to believe, will be effective, for it is independent, and will not be given by a skilful soldier except under a calculable chance of striking." ("A View of the Formation, Discipline and Economy of Armies." Robert Jackson. 1804.)
By means of his new system of tactics, Frederick won his first two Silesian campaigns. He outmanuvred his enemy on nearly every occasion, and, by placing his main force obliquely to his enemy's flank, completely rolled it up and so won battle after battle. His movements were always made in open column, no skirmishers being used. His tactics, except for the absence of light troops, were purely Grecian, movement, followed by shock in place of demoralisation culminating in the charge. Like Grecian tactics, his were purely mechanical, and his battles were won on a preconceived plan as if by clockwork. As the Grecian phalanx destroyed all other phalanxes, through the superiority of its mechanical regularity, so did the Prussian line destroy all other lines; but as the Grecian phalanx was ultimately destroyed by the more flexible legions of Rome, so were the Prussian lines destroyed by the more active columns and skirmishers which characterised the armies of the French Revolution under the skilful leadership of Bonaparte who based his tactics on the old tactics of Caesar.
FREDERICK AND THE AUSTRIAN LIGHT TROOPS Whilst the Prussian grenadier, bepowdered, befrogged and bepipeclayed, was gyrating to the drumtap on the parade ground at Potsdam, bands of wild Croats and Pandours were being raised in Austria, which, at Kolin, in 1757, were to give Frederick's tactics a rude shaking ("A General Essay on Tactics." M. Guibert. London, 1781.)
In 1756, the Austrians raised many light troops, and the following year at Kohn, whilst Frederick was once again attempting his now stereotyped manouvre, these proved the danger of persistently neglecting the principles of war. Whilst manuvring under the enemy's eyes, the right flanks of Frederick's columns had to pass by several villages and some broken ground both of which were held by the Austrian light troops. Such a galling fire was brought to bear against Frederick's right flank, that his men piecemeal formed front to the fire, and as this took place before they had reached their oblique position of attack, the whole plan collapsed, the result being that Frederick was defeated with the loss of 14,000 men and 43 guns. Napoleon criticising the Prussian attack at Kolin said: "It is the instinct which forbids men to allow themselves to be killed without defending themselves," which made the Prussian form to their right flank.
In the following year, during the campaign of 1758, Loudon, who had had much experience in handling the Austrian light troops, renewed an interesting proposal he had made some time before. He suggested that two battalions of grenadiers should be permanently attached to his Croats. "These . . ." he said, "though animated by incontestable courage, were not accustomed to make an attack in close order; they had been taught to spread themselves out as skirmishers, and as such they were invaluable; but, if supported by a solid body of some 1,800 grenadiers their value would be quadrupled. The request was granted." ("Loudon." p. 91. Colonel G. B. Malleson,) Unfortunately, the very same month in which these grenadiers were incorporated, Loudon quitted Vienna to take over another command, and was never able to see his plan put into execution. It is a remarkable fact that though Loudon was a skilful light infantry leader, he cannot have entirely grasped the full advantage to be gained from light infantry; for, at Leignitz, in 1760, when he was instructed to occupy the heights of Pfaffendorf, the occupation of which would have cut Frederick's line of retreat, he attempted to do so without using skirmishers to his front, so that he might surprise the enemy with his full force. The result was that he himself was surprised, for on approaching the heights he found them already occupied by the Prussians. The reason for this may have been that his light troops were so wanting in training that he could not trust them out of his sight; in any case it was a risky operation.
His defeat at Kolin opened Frederick's eyes to the necessity of light troops for the protection of his army. Shortly after this battle he increased the one company of riflemen he possessed to a battalion ("History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade," p. 4. Colonel W. Verner); and, copying the methods of the Austrians, he collected deserters, smugglers and the wild spirits among his own people ("Organisation." Colonel H. Foster) and formed them into a kind of light infantry. Frederick also raised Jaegers, or huntsmen, who were accustomed to use the more accurate sporting rifle.
All these light troops, Austrian, Prussian and French, save for the corps of Grassin, were virtually sharpshooters. They were not employed as the forerunners of the decisive attack, but simply to annoy and "snipe" the enemy on every possible occasion, or to act as a manuvre screen to cover the regular infantry's advance. They were not light troop as Hannibal knew them, or as Sir John Moore was to understand them, namely, a highly trained body of infantry, but independent riflemen, similar to the hillmen of the North-West Frontier of India, or to the Boers of the South African veldt. They possessed, however, the essential virtues of light troops - they were good shots, agile, intelligent and self-reliant-and when later these freischarren, free hordes, were disciplined and combined with the troops of the line, we find reviving once again the ancient glories of the Art of war ("A General Essay on Tactics," p. 311 M. Guibert. London, 1781.)
At about this time, when Frederick was learning the lesson of Kohn, we find the Duke de Broglie forming special corps of Chasseurs in the French Army. "He gave to each battalion a light company, and expected his whole infantry to fight in extended order." In 1759, at Bergen, he employed light infantry with signal success; he again employed them, in 1760, in the manner suggested by Guibert, namely, as trained troops and not as an irregular rabble.
Prior to 1760, so the "Encyclopedie Methodique" states, Chasseurs were unknown in the French Army. At this time M. de Broglie formed one company of them in each of the battalions he commanded. On January 4th, 1760, the King raised two corps of Chasseurs. One was attached to Berchiny's Hussars, the other to Turpin's. Each corps consisted of 5 companies, one of which was a grenadier company 60 strong. Chasseurs a pied were raised in 1776, one company was allotted to each infantry regiment. The men were chosen with great care. A company consisted of 144 men in 8 squads, 2 squads formed a sub-division, 2 sub-divisions a division. Vol. I., pp. 585, 586.
Duhesme informs us that Frederick's chasseurs a pied, as he calls them, were raised by him chiefly to oppose the Pandours and for escort work. This assertion is fully supported by Frederick's own instructions, ("Military Instructions written by the King of Prussia for the Generals of his Army. . . . Together with Short Instructions for the use of his Light Troops," pp. 91-94. London, 1762,) in which we read: "Hussars and Pandours are formidable to those only who are unacquainted with them. They are never courageous. . . . Our troops have nothing to fear from them; but as their skirmishing retards a march, and as they now and then kill a few men, whom we are sorry to lose in such a manner, I shall prescribe such means as will most effectually counteract their attempts. . . .
"If you are retreating thro' a plain, the Hussars may be dispersed by a few volleys of cannon, and the Pandours by your Hussars and Dragoons, of whom they are terribly afraid . . ." When passing through woods numerous flankers should be thrown out, "each line of infantry must be intermixed with small parties of Dragoons. . ."
"The Pandours frequently lie flat upon the ground, and discharge their pieces in that situation. . . . Neither the fire of your musketry, nor your cannon charged with grape shot can do them much mischief, as they are generally concealed behind trees, or laid flat upon their bellies.
"The most successful method of dislodging the enemy from any of their posts which are defended only by light troops, is to attack it at once briskly without ceremony, for as they are accustomed to a straggling method of fighting, they are unable to bear the shock of a regular onset."
In these instructions we find much sound advice, such as in the last paragraph, which contains the essence of how to defeat light infantry and irregulars. But it must be remembered that to attack light infantry briskly, as Frederick lays down, it is necessary to have troops as mobile as the enemy. Such troops, to all intents and purposes, Frederick did not possess; he relied on his Hussars for emergencies (On his accession to the throne Frederick had 720 Hussars; at his death these numbered 15,000. The first regiment of Light Dragoons was raised in England by General Elliot in 1769, no other was added until 1773. See "A Partial Reorganisation of the British Army," p. 42. General J. Money.) Also we find that advanced guard duties and patrols are carried out by his mounted men. Only once, throughout these Instructions, do we find mention of "foot-hunters "; but for this solitary exception, the duties of his light infantry, and by 1762 he had raised a few, are only conspicuous through their absence.
This was evidently bluff on the part of Frederick, for in a letter of Major-General Joseph York to his father, the Earl of Hardwicke, written from the Hague on July 31, 1758, we read of a conversation he had with Frederick the Great in which the king told him that. (See "Life and Correspondence of Philip York, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke," Vol. III., p. 224. P. C. Yorke) ". . .The most formidable enemy he has to fight with are the Croats, commonly called the Pandours, who are a hardy, brave people, faithful to their sovereign and indefatigable. There is no instance of their deserting, and not only that, but they prevent the regular troops from getting away likewise. His Majesty has, by dint of pains and precautions, got the better of the apprehensions his troops had of them; and by giving them no quarter in the two last campaigns he has reduced them to be more civilised. He owned to me that he was more upon his guard against them than against any other troops, and that he hoped I didn't believe that he had that contempt of them that he expressed; but that he found no other way to inspire a confidence into his troops than by treating them as canaille, or the lowest of soldiers; that it was impossible for him to oppose anything equal to them in that land, and that he did not like to be always sacrificing his regular infantry in that kind of war; that he had, therefore, raised a number of free battalions, but that did not suffice, nor were they anything to compare in goodness; but that was the only resource he had against them except his artillery, of which they were much afraid."
This is further confirmed by Frederick himself in his "Histoire de mon Temps." He writes: "Chaque botte de paille coutait du sang. Moratz, Trenk, Nadasty et Frankini etaient infatigables, et l'on peut dire qu'ils donnaient les premieres lecons dans l'art de la petite guerre."
FREDERICK'S USE OF ARTILLERY Besides the broadside fire of his heavy infantry, Frederick largely relied on his artillery to demoralise the enemy so that his cavalry could charge home. During the Seven Years War, the Austrians greatly increased their artillery and made such good use of cover by ground, that Frederick attached howitzers to his infantry regiments in order to search the rear slopes of the positions occupied by the Austrians. This howitzer fire may be compared to the high angle fire of the early Grecian archers, when, from behind the phalanx, they discharged their arrows over the heads of the pikemen. In his latter campaigns, however, Frederick invariably avoided battle as far as it was possible.
This massing of artillery by Frederick the Great was not only due to the fact that his defeat at Kohn had been partially caused by the superiority of the Austrian artillery, but because, as his movements in column towards a flank could not be covered by the fire of skirmishers, gun-fire had to be used instead; it thus came about that artillery fire took the place of infantry fire. At Olmutz, 1758, Frederick issued his memorable order that sixty pieces were to advance against the enemy's flank which had been chosen for the point of attack, until they were close enough to fire case. "The King's views, however, went further. He said to himself that the artillery was not only casually to prepare the victory, it must also be adapted so as to be able to search out the enemy when the terrain concealed him from view, or the cannon from other reasons were insufficient to do so. He, consequently, increased his howitzers to an extent previously unheard of, and they constituted one-third of the whole of his artillery" ("The Influence of Firearms upon Tactics," p. 60.) Frederick the Great had by now become convinced that the act of demoralisation must be carried out by the artillery and artillery alone. "The whole of the howitzers," he says in his Instructions, issued on May 3rd, 1768, "must be brought to that place according to which of the enemy's flanks is to be attacked . . . and the artillery officers must direct their fire so that the fire from all the batteries shall be concentrated right upon that spot where the attack is to be made . . . and the howitzers must, when the enemy has been driven away, follow him up; and it must be the chief object of the artillery officers who command these batteries, to concentrate them on the second place as much as they did upon the first, and bring a cross-fire to bear upon the heights with the batteries which surround the position."
Before the invention of firearms, weapons themselves forced the tactical division of heavy and light infantry upon the commanders of armies. Hannibal, in his inherent greatness as a light infantry commander, gave his Baliaxes a spear and shield as well as a sling, so that they might temporarily, if not permanently, combine the tactics of light and heavy infantry, or missile throwers and stabbers. The invention of the musket and bayonet had produced a weapon eminently suited to this combined method of fighting, and it is astonishing that Frederick never once, in his many battles, really grasped this system of attack.