CHAPTER VII

The Lessons of the Seven Years' War

THE SPELL OF ROSSBACH

The Peace of Paris closed the Seven Years' War, a war in which the oblique line of Frederick had triumphed over the tactics of his enemies. His successes, due to his mobility and to the immobility of his opponents, threw into obscurity the leading tactical lesson of the war, which, in my opinion, was that the fire of light infantry will wreck any column or line unprotected by a light infantry screen. The glamour and glitter of Rossbach and Leuthen dazzled the eyes of the tacticians of the day to the true lessons of Kolin and Hochkirchen. And the result was, that in place of seeking a new tactics which would destroy the tactics of Frederick, they slavishly adopted his system of attack with all its faults, shut their ears to history, abandoned all common sense, all individuality, and prepared for themselves in a method as thorough as it was thoughtless the disasters they sustained during the Napoleonic wars.

Failing once again to appreciate the value of light infantry, we find that, after the peace of 1763, as after the peace of 1748, the politicians once again reduced the army and disbanded the light companies, which force of circumstances and the dire necessity of war had impelled its commanders to raise. These reductions were carried out not only to save expense, but because it was still considered that untrained men could be banded together at a moment's notice and dubbed light infantry; and because the military pedants in London, having grown fat on the stiff mechanical drill of Prussia, could not and would not bring themselves to believe, in spite of all the experiences of the late wars, that light troops were not only an aid, not only a necessity, but an integral part of all skilfully organised armies.

However, in Great Britain, a new school of war was forming, the opinions of which no amount of hair-grease and pipe-clay could smother. The times were changing in spite of the rulers of mankind, and men and women were beginning to assert their rights to be treated like human beings in place of movable chattels. This spirit which was sweeping over the mobs of the people was also sweeping over the ranks of the soldiers. Fear, a tergo, was the compelling force of the Prussian line; it was a capricious force, and one quite unsuited to the British temperament. It might compel armies to march on to the battlefield, but it could not compel them to fight. "Never beat your men,"' says a military manual of the year 1760, "it is unmanly. I have too often seen a brave, honest old soldier banged and battered at the caprice of an arrogant officer" ("History of the British Army," Vol. II, p. 578. Hon. J. W. Fortescue.) Howe, Wolfe, Monckton, and Murray were all officers of the new school who sought to overcome the vices of their men by cultivating their virtues. The old solid drill was a little, but only a very little, giving way before the new discipline; it was determined to die hard.

During this period a distinct change is to be found in the training of British infantry. In the "Exercise for the Horse, Dragoon, and Foot Forces, London, 1728," republished in 1739, we find the training of the soldier divided under five headings

(1) The Manual Exercise. 59 Sections.

(2) The Grenadier Exercise. 19 Sections.

(3) The Evolution. 61 Sections.

(4) Battalion Movements.

(5) Street-firing.

This manual is very similar to that of 1690, though the "screw-bayonet " has vanished from it.

In the "Exercise for the Foot," Limerick, 1758, we find the Grenadier Company still mentioned though not so fully as before; but what we do find in this manual is that the firing exercise is most minutely dealt with in 86 sections. "The Firing as practised by the Guards," is also fully explained.

By 1758, firing had become the important question in infantry training, and, as far as this went, it was a distinct advance in tactics.

TURPIN'S ESSAY ON THE ART OF WAR

In the French Army we see the same process at work. The armies of Louis XV. had received a severe shaking, and, in 1763, immediately as peace had been declared, Choiseul set himself the task of reforming them on the Prussian model. "Frederick the Great was the commander above all others who had humiliated the French, therefore, in Choiseul's view, all changes must be copied from the Prussian model" ("History of the British Army," Vol. IV., p. 8.) Detail in place of war training became the order of the day, until, a few years before the French Revolution, Duhesme tells us exactness was pushed to such an extreme - "jusqu'a avoir dans les casernes des horloges a balancier et des echelles géometriques gravees sur les paves" - (as even to have in the barracks clockwork pendulums, and geometrical scales out on the pavement) "Essai Historique sur l'Infanterie legere," p. 136. Par le Comte Duhesme, 1864.

But the French nation was then, as it is still, not one to submit for long to the antics of a foreign power. Her tacticians soon freed themselves from the spell of Rossbach, so that to their writings, more so than to the deeds of Pandour and Croat, may be traced the steady infiltration of the idea that a trained light infantry was a necessity to every civilised army.

Folard, as we have seen, set forth his idea of column, line and skirmisher nearly thirty years before this date (1764). Marshal de Saxe and the Duke de Broglie had greatly improved upon his system; and, contemporaneously with them, M. le Comte Turpin de Crisse, a writer of considerable tactical insight, had fully grasped the value of light infantry in war. He set forth his ideas on light infantry in his "Essai sur I'Art de la Guerre," published in 1754, which, as I have already noted, was studied by Colonel Bouquet. The essentials of his system are as follows:

Light infantry can carry out all the duties of Hussars in covering and protecting an army and in seizing tactical points, but usually regiments of light troops are composed half of foot and half of horse. "The only difference between the duty of light infantry and light horse, during a campaign, is that the latter can march with more facility and expedition to whatever part they are ordered; in other respects they equally contribute to the security of an army, and, by joining, shelter themselves from every sort of danger; nothing can stop them, and they are in a manner certain of succeeding in whatever enterprise they undertake." During an attack, light infantry should be employed on the flanks, they should also be used for holding woods, ravines and defiles. "It is certain," writes Turpin, "that light troops are very necessary during war; it is they who should carry out all the irregular fighting (guerre de campagne); it is they who should protect both infantry and cavalry whilst foraging, and also guard convoys; who should reconnoitre the line of march of an army, who will prevent the troops being surprised, and who will save both infantry and cavalry from much fatigue . . . "

"It is very requisite for an officer of light troops to obtain a thorough individual knowledge of the men under his command, that he may employ them according to their intelligence and courage. One sergeant, corporal or private will answer better for reconnoitring openly the enemy - that is, for approaching him - so as to be able to give a tolerable account of the post which he occupies, and of his force. Another will be better employed as a scout, or in watching the enemy's motions without discovering himself. . . . Others are subject to infirmities, amongst which those of eye sight must be particularly noticed; and, even among them, some who see well in the daytime are almost blind at night. Some old soldiers have the genius of resources, and having observed some situation or passage, may be able to give good information, which ought to be turned to advantage. And as some are naturally awkward, and easily alarmed, it is very important to know them, in order not to employ them where they might communicate their fears. All those different characters may be easily found out by conversing with the men, and chiefly by attending to their reports." "Essai sur I'Art de la Guerre," pp. 175-9. M. le Comte Turpin de Crisse. 1754. See also "Light Infantry," by Major A. E. Mockler-Ferryman. "The Oxfordshire Light Infantry Chronicle," p. 299, 1896.

The essence of Turpin's discipline was common sense in place of plummet and pace-stick - the development of each individual according to his natural gifts and character in place of attempting to make all soldiers, whatever their dispositions might be, resemble a row of polished knobs on a leather strap.

THE TACTICS OF MESNIL-DURAND

Even in France, little attention was paid to Folard, de Saxe, de Broglie and Turpin de Crisse during the years immediately following the Seven Years War; but the hypnotic influence of this war was not to last long - a brief ten years at most - for soon again we find intelligence reasserting itself in military affairs. Once Frederick's system was adopted, its disadvantages, day by day became more apparent. The slight depth of his battle-line, its great extent, which rendered command most difficult, the want of reserves and skirmishers all showed it to be a system radically faulty; nevertheless in the French Army, as is unfortunately the case at all times in all armies, the smaller minds were in the majority, and were still enthralled by Frederick's successes which were due more to his drill than to his tactics.

When Marshal Bellisle advocated his system of columns, he was severely criticised. His column was to consist of seven hundred and sixty-eight men, thirty-two ranks deep, on a frontage of twenty-four; each of these columns was to be supported by fifty cavalry, and the columns were only to open fire when it was impossible to make use of the bayonet. This formation was an indifferent one, its tactics were faulty; nevertheless it stimulated discussion, and discussion opened men's eyes to the fact that Frederick's tactics were not the ne plus ultra of perfection.

Marshal de Bellisle's great supporter was M. de Mesnil-Durand, who, in 1774, outlined his famous system of tactics :

"He proposed to form battalions in close columns of grand divisions or double companies, and that all deployments should be on the leading double company; he recommended battalions in ten companies, two of which were invariably to skirmish.

"When the battalion was deployed, these companies were on the flanks slightly in rear, so that between battalions deployed in line there was the front of two companies, regiments being composed of four battalions.

"When several battalions worked together they were to be formed in line of double company columns at deploying intervals, covered by the whole of the flank companies as skirmishers.

"Columns, said Mesnil-Durand, mass the greatest amount of force in the smallest space, and alone can, on account of the narrowness of the front and the greatness of the intervals between them, give free movement to cavalry or artillery, but these columns must be linked together by thick chains of skirmishers. Infantry has two weapons to fight with, and it should have two distinct formations: line is the best for firing, column for manoeuvres and attack. In every case, without exception, that formation should be used which is the most suitable at the moment.

"The primitive formation of all troops should be in line of battalions at deploying intervals. So formed, any requisite manoeuvre may be easily carried out. The shallow formation has a natural tendency to make men halt and fire, the order in column has a tendency to make men advance.

"When troops are deployed in two lines with cavalry on the flanks, they are weak everywhere, are incapable of the least manoeuvre, and the cavalry, artillery and infantry do not support one another.

"When, on the contrary, each battalion is in column, the flank companies being in the battalion intervals, the cavalry placed in rear can easily and unexpectedly charge to the front. This order is strong everywhere; it threatens the enemy with the fire of the skirmishers, the weight of its columns, and the charge of its cavalry. An army so formed can march and manoeuvre with the greatest ease and rapidity" ("A Precis of Modem Tactics," p. 235. Colonel Robert Home. Revised by Lieut.-Colonel Sisson. C. Pratt. 1892.)

Mesnil-Durand's system may be considered as a new dispensation in the history of tactics. He suggested the employment of light infantry as an integral fighting part of every battalion. He realised that the two weapons, shock and missile, required two formations - the line to demoralise and the column to destroy. He based his system absolutely on the tactical rule that fire must prepare shock, and it only required the master-mind of Napoleon to breathe life into his columns in order to prove their essential worth. Mesnil-Durand further advocated the formation of company columns for the same reason as he advocated battalion colurrins, and he was right, for eventually these small columns ousted the larger ones and became the basis of present day tactics.

GUIBERT'S ESSAY ON TACTICS

Guibert has generally been looked upon as an opponent of Mesnil-Durand, but in fact he was not so. Mesnil-Durand's system, through its sheer novelty, at once attracted adherents; the deeds of the Croats, Pandours, and Tyrolese riflemen were now remembered, and Guibert saw that there was a danger of the army veering from one extreme to the other, and of becoming light infantry in place of grenadiers. What Guibert really opposed was the raising of " free-bands " of irregulars in place of relying on trained light infantry. In his "Essay" ("General Essay on Tactics," pp. 306-11. M. Guibert. London, 1781.) he writes:

"If it be possible to create a system of war which renders the great number of light troops of less use in that particular service to which they are appointed to, it is still more so in disciplining the troops of the line to act in concert with them. What difference is there between the appointment of a battalion and that of a corps of light troops? Are not the men of the same nature, clothed and armed in the same manner? . . .

"By thus employing troops of the line, and even the elite of these troops to act as vanguard, and in all other material business, much greater check will be given to the enemy's operations; this is an important object to be considered, because the bravery and confidence of an army is, in general, acquired by the superiority of their daily success. These elite corps in advance are most to be depended on, less subject to be defeated, better adapted to wait for reinforcements or fresh dispositions. Thus the whole of the army, inured to the sight of the enemy, becomes warlike and enlightened. If, contrary to this, as is the opinion of many people, light troops are generally increased, employed daily in the minutiae of a campaign, the army is unaccustomed to all exterior duty; it degenerates in the midst of idleness in its camp, and only sees the enemy on the day of battle. When these days of real action are at hand, then these light troops just found for service . . . retreat to suffer the fate of the action . . . to be decided by the troops of the line, who, by their having been continually kept at a distance from such scenes are greatly astonished at the spectacle before them, and flurried to that degree that a third of their execution is, in general, lost."

For irregular troops, Guibert suggests: a corps of not more than one thousand to twelve hundred men - two-thirds cavalry and one-third infantry. These were to be employed in harassing and observing the enemy. ". . . At night to be on one spot, in the morning posted on another." The infantry were to act as a support to the cavalry.

The light infantry were to be quite distinct from the irregular troops; they were to be trained to fight in line as well as in extended order, and their ranks were to be filled with picked soldiers - "chosen veterans." The officers of light infantry must "not fear to be beaten, when they know that by being so they are of real service to the army."

Light infantry soldiers should be practised in swimming, running and everything which increases their bodily strength. "In peace" their officers "should teach them those exercises which are found serviceable in war." Officers should be taught reporting and field fortification." They should be informed how art, and other illusions in point of ground, make troops appear more or less in number; by fortifying or preparing their eye for these illusions, how to employ their discoveries in an offensive manner against the enemy. Reports to be accurate and not exaggerated; . . . in short, though some of these falsehoods may raise officers to a momentary eclat, yet there are still more that have greatly abased them, or that have only given them transient merit, which other occasions of more consequence have entirely obliterated."

From the above quotations it can scarcely be said that Guibert was an opponent to light infantry; in fact he was its very best friend, and, being a man of profound tactical insight, he considered the time had arrived for all troops to be trained not only as heavy infantry, but as light infantry as well.

Guibert had actually seen service with light infantry during the Seven Years War, and in his book he mentions that de Broglie, in 1760, employed trained light infantry in place of an irregular rabble. In 1775, the Duke de Broglie carried out experimental tests of column versus line, and, in 1776, Mesnil-Durand's system was adopted by the French Army. There can be no doubt that this system was as superior to the system of Frederick, as the tactics of the Roman legion were to those of the Grecian phalanx.