British Light Infantry in the 18th Century

CHAPTER IX

The Hessians

THE RAISING OF THE HESSIANS

The reductions of the British Army in 1763 left it so weak and disorganised that it was unable adequately to protect the extensive empire which had passed with the Peace of Paris into British hands. The nation did not like the army, and, as we have already seen, the growth of the army had been a surreptitious one, depending on a process of neglecting to disband rather than on raising new units.

When war broke out in 1775, negotiations were opened with the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel with a view of obtaining from him twelve thousand five hundred Hessian mercenaries. These were to be formed into twelve regiments of five companies each, four battalions of grenadiers, two companies of Jaegers and some artillery. Brunswick was to raise four thousand, Hesse-Hanau nine hundred, and Waldek seven hundred and fifty. Frederick the Great, Schiller, Kant, Klopstock and Lessing strongly opposed this raising of German troops, but their protests were disregarded, and, between 1775-81, no less than thirty thousand were recruited ("The German Soldier in the Wars of the United States," pp. 58-63. J. G. Rosengarten.) Most of these men were excellent fighters in spite of the slights they received from both British soldiers and politicians. Even as late as 1804, by which time their services must have been fully known and appreciated, we find so enlightened a man as Robert Jackson writing: "Spoil is the incentive to activity in the German sharpshooter; he may be considered as a long-shot assassin." "A View of the Formation, Discipline and Economy of Armies," p. 104. Robert Jackson, M.D., See Appendix II.

The Hessian Jaegers and riflemen had for many years past been famous as marksmen and as mercenaries. As far back as 1631, the Landgrave William of Hesse had armed three companies of chasseurs with the rifle. Fourteen years later, the Elector Maxmilian of Bavaria formed three regiments of chasseurs; and, in 1674, Frederick William of Prussia had ordered that in every company of infantry there should be several chasseurs and tirailleurs armed with rifles. "History and Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade," Vol. I, p. 3. Colonel W. Verner. In the Thirty Years War, George Margrave of Barden, John Duke of Brandenburg, Christian Duke of Brunswick, and Ernest Count of Mansfeld, all raised partisans. "Essai sur la Guerre de Partisans." General Denis Davidoff, 1841. What eventually became of these picked shots I have been unable to trace; probably they were disbanded, or returned to their companies as musketeers, for in those days the rifle was a very slow-loading weapon, and Frederick the Great's fire tactics were based on rapidity rather than on accuracy of fire. The Hessians of 1775 were not all picked troops, but their Jaegers were trained marksmen, and were for the most part recruited from huntsmen and gamekeepers; they were armed with the rifle and carried the bugle horn.

Captain von Heister brought over to America, in August, 1776, the first of the two Jaeger companies raised for the British service, the second, under Captain Ewald, arriving in October. These companies were found so useful that, in 1777, they were increased to one thousand and sixty-seven men and organised in five companies, one being mounted. The whole force was placed under the command of Lieut.-Colonel von Wurmb (Following Major Pfister, there appear to have been several officers of the name of Wurmb serving in the Hessians: Major Phillip von Wurmb; Colonel von Wurmb; Capt. von Wurmb, and a Ludwig J. Adolph von Wurmb,) but companies generally operated independently (From the "Journal of the Jaeger Corps," it appears that the corps numbered 600; 1,067 was probably only its establishment. See also Eelking's "Hulfstruppen, etc.") The Commanders-in-Chief of the Hessians were Lieut.-General Phillip von Heister, 1777-78, and Lieut.-General Baron von Knyphausen, 1778-82.

As in my book, "Sir John Moore's System of Training," I have stated that Sir John was, in all probability, acquainted with Captain Ewald's work on light infantry tactics, I will deal therefore at some length with von Ewald's operations, tactics and training, because these resulted in the creation of the most skilful light infantry force raised during the American War.

Johann Ewald was born in Cassel on March 30th, 1744. He entered the Hessian Infantry Regiment of Gelsa as a cadet and went through the last campaign of the Seven Years' War. In 1765, he was posted to a Guards Regiment at Cassel, and, in 1770, lost an eye in a duel. In January, 1775, when Colonel Fawcit arrived from England to negotiate the raising of some twelve thousand five hundred Hessians with the Landgrave, Ewald and his Jaegers were selected to form part of this force. He and his men left Germany in May, 1776, under Lieut.General von Knyphausen. He served through the American War of Independence and was present with Lord Cornwallis when he capitulated at Yorktown in 1781. In 1784, he returned to Cassel and, in 1788, was promoted to the rank of Lieut.Colonel in the Danish Service, in which he raised the Holstein Jaeger Corps. Later he was promoted to the rank of Lieut.-General and became a "von," and eventually Commander-in-Chief of the forces in Holstein. He served with distinction throughout the Napoleonic Wars, and died near Kiel on June 25th, 1813 ("Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie." 1877.)

Captain Ewald was a prolific writer on light infantry training and tactics. In 1785, he wrote "Abhandlung uber den Kleinen Krieg" ("A Treatise on Guerilla Warfare.") This book deals largely with light infantry experiences gleaned by him during the American War. It is interesting to note that Frederick the Great spoke very highly of this work. In 1790, Abhandlung vom Dienst der leichten Truppen ("A Treatise upon the Duties of Light Troops") appeared. This work was translated into English, in 1803. Also "Gesprache eines Husaren-corporals, eines Jaegers und leichten Infanteristen uber die Pflichten und den Dienst der leichten Soldaten" ("Conversations of a Hussar Corporal, a Jäger and a Light Infantryman upon the Duties and the Services of Light Troops"). In 1794, "Belehrungen uber den Krieg, besonders uber den Kleinen Krieg" ("Lessons of the War, especially of Guerilla Warfare"), and several others ("A Biography" of General von Ewald was written by his son, Karl von Ewald, and published in 1838.)

In October, 1776, the Hessians joined General Howe and, on the 23rd of this month, they passed through their baptism of fire, being met by a superior force of American riflemen and driven back. It is probable they would have been severely cut up if it had not been for the timely arrival of Howe's Highlanders. Heisters Jaeger company had already been engaged at the battle of Flatbush (August 27th, 1776), and at this engagement the Jaegers had learnt the value of long and thin lines of riflemen, well protected on their flanks, as an offensive formation against solid lines formed on the Prussian model. "The German Soldier in the Wars of the United States," p. 121. J. G. Rosengarten. ". . . General von Heister with two German brigades . . . advanced along the Flatbush road, confining himself to a cannonade only until the turning movement began to make itself felt, when he threw his infantry against the heights. Sullivan's (American General) division had already begun to retire from the hill, but his retreating troops were checked by the Light Dragoons and Light Infantry until the Grenadiers and Thirty-third had actually pushed on to within musket-shot of the fortified lines in rear of the hills, and the British were only with difficulty restrained from storming them on the spot. Nearer to the hills another battalion of Light Infantry engaged a force of Americans who were retiring before Heister's attack, and being outnumbered were for a time hard pressed; by being joined by the Guards they continued the struggle, even capturing three guns, until at last the arrival of the Hessians put the Americans to utter rout." "History of the British Army," Vol. III., p. 184. Hon. J. W. Fortescue.

As the war progressed, Ewald's little band grew famous for their courage and daring, but it was his superb leadership which crowned their enterprises with success. Seldom can there have been a soldier with greater presence of mind, higher courage and common sense than Johann Ewald.

In 1777, near Raritan Landing, on the Boundbrook Road, Ewald, whilst in a sunken lane, was caught in flank by Colonel Buttlar's light infantry, "whereupon my men, who were usually brave fellows, lost their heads and ran away. Astonished, as you may readily believe, I called after them: 'You may run to the devil, but I'll stay here alone!' At this moment I perceived that one man, Jaeger Bauer, had stayed by me. He answered, 'No, you shall not stay alone,' and he called after the chasseurs that were making off: 'Boys! Stop! A scoundrel runs away!' After he had shouted out these words a few times they all came back and fought like brave fellows." "These Hessians," p. 179. Edward J. Lowell.

Another incident of Ewald's daring and resource is told by Max von Eelking. On one occasion Ewald was left at a village called Mount Holly to keep open the road to Princeton. He had only ninety men with him, and the task was a most difficult one, as the inhabitants were bitterly opposed to the royal cause; further, Ewald knew that arms and ammunition were hidden in the village.

"There were two bridges which made the approach of the enemy easy. Ewald showed his energy and readiness by the way he acted. He covered the bridges and the nearest houses with straw, and then summoning the leading people, told them that the moment there was any outbreak he would set fire to the place. As Mount Holly was a well-to-do village and the shops were full of valuable goods, his precaution was effective, and he remained undisturbed until midnight, then withdrew and joined Donop at Crosswicks. Ewald had no intention to bum the village, but his threat enabled him to hold it quietly." "The German Allied Troops in the North American War of Independence, 1776-83," p. 75. (An abridged translation of Max von Eelking.) J. G. Rosengarten.

Ewald's example so influenced his men that their deeds of personal gallantry and collective courage soon won the applause of both friend and foe. As early as May, 1778, General Howe "gave especial praise to the Hessian Jaegers in his farewell to their Captains Ewald and Wreden." Rosengarten tells us that: "The Hessian Jaegers under Ewald . . . won general praise for their heroic courage, and the good example set by them in being foremost in the attack and always ready on the defensive. . . . His reputation for skill and success in handling his own little force was recognised alike by his English allies and his American foes. It consisted, at the outset of the siege of Yorktown, of one hundred and twenty-five Jaegers, one hundred grenadiers, one hundred Rangers and thirty dragoons, but at the surrender it was reduced to one-sixth of its original strength." "The German Soldier in the Wars of the United States," p. 82. J. G. Rosengarten. When Tarleton attempted to force his way out of Yorktown in 1781, the German cavalry were under Ewald.

Ewald was a strong believer in the superiority of the attack over the defence, and to his invariable rule of attacking, when to attack was in any way feasible, may be attributed his numerous successes. "At Fleur de Hundred (Flourde Hundret), March, 1780, Baron Steuben had a force of seven or eight thousand men to bar the way to Portsmouth. Ewald with fifty foot Jaegers and three companies of Rangers, drove in the American outpost, and, with Simcoe's cavalry, forced the advance to retreat, and then entered Portsmouth, the chief depot of supplies of the American army in the south. The Americans made frequent attempts to recover it, but Ewald was always on his guard, and showed such watchfulness and energy that he not only kept the enemy off, but also captured officers with despatches of great value to Arnold.

“Ewald's rule was always to attack. In his book on ‘War' he lays it down as a maxim that whenever the enemy is met at night, he must be attacked at once and followed by a bayonet charge, so that the leader of the advance can ascertain the strength of the enemy, mask his own, and make his plans for his next movement."

On March 19th, one of Ewald's patrols of sixteen Jaegers was met near Portsmouth by a column of eight hundred Americans under General de Lafayette. Ewald, who was present with the patrol, was quite undaunted by this superiority in numbers - fifty to one! He hurried up sixteen more Jaegers, and so posted his men that they commanded the narrow top of a dam, which could ony be crossed at a time by three men abreast. The Americans three times advanced to the attack, deployed three hundred men against Ewald and his thirty-two, but in vain, for after the third assault Lafayette withdrew his column ("The German Allied Troops in the North American War of Independence," p. 202. J. G. Rosengarten.) With this truly memorable feat of arms I will close the exploits of this dashing and thoughtful light infantry leader.

After his return from America, we learn from his biography that Ewald assiduously set himself to write various works on light infantry, their training, duties and tactics. In 1790 appeared his admirable "Abhundlung vom Dienst der leichten Truppen," which, in 1803, was translated into English by A. Maimburg, late Lieut. of the 8th (or King's) Regt. of Infantry. This book was dedicated by permission to His Royal Highness the Duke of York. The English title runs as follows: "A Treatise upon the Duties of Light Troops Translated from the German of Colonel von Ehwald of the Danish Sleswick Jaeger Corps, and Knight of the Hessian Order Pour le Merite." (The "h" has been inserted in his name probably for phonetic reasons The copy in my possession formerly belonged to Lieut. Colonel the Hon. William Stewart, one of the founders of the Rifle Brigade.)

It is impossible, by mere extracts, to do justice to this book, which is a work of genius, as true today in the principles it lays down as it was when written a hundred and thirty-five years ago. The very first sentence of this work shows von Ewald's grasp of essentials. He writes: "In a military system where it is wished that light troops should be made less necessary, the only way would be to instruct the troops of the line to perform those particular duties. . . . Why should not the troops of the line be taught and practise the same duties, being (as they are) made up of the same sort of men, and clothed and armed alike? The difference of the name alone cannot constitute a different kind of troops." (This suggestion was probably taken from Guibert.)

The importance of von Ewalds treatise lies in the fact that it is based on hard-won experiences during six years of a most difficult war (1775-81), and not on books and peace-made tactics. Further, that he never commanded more than from a hundred to four hundred men, and gained, therefore, an insight into that method of fighting - which may be called the tactics of the regimental officer."

To the leader of an army von Ewald may be of little use, but to the regimental officer who has to act on the spur of the moment, in place of pondering over maps and foolscap, we have yet to discover his equal as an instructor, in spite of the fact that his treatise was written over a hundred and thirty years ago.

Colonel von Ewald was a master of stratagems, nevertheless, he not only shows cunning, but common sense. He is bound by no rules, and only asks for skill, discipline and daring, trusting that these three qualities will create their own rules and means as occasion requires. "Demoralise the enemy, then annihilate him," is the heart and soul of his doctrine. Follow him up, and if he retire, worry him to death if you cannot crush him. To let him escape "is indeed acting in a Christian-like manner," he writes, "but it is not doing justice to our King and Country, for the principal duty of a general is to put an end to the war as soon as possible " (p. 232).

To carry out such tactics, ceaseless energy and an unflagging mobility are necessary. Therefore, von Ewald writes that all infantry should be not only infantry of the line, but also light infantry. An army should not only be capable of hugging an enemy like a bear, but of coursing him like a greyhound. Further, he writes: "Experience proves that an army provided with a sufficient body of these troops (light troops), under the command of able and enterprising leaders, enjoys perfect security in its camp, while another, deficient in that respect, is constantly alarmed and teased on every side, beseiged in its own camp, and when on the march is perpetually harassed by the enemy" (p. 7). The Light Division, which during the Peninsula War was never once surprised, strikingly corroborates von Ewald's experience.

Von Ewald had not only served in light corps, but had helped to raise and recruit them, and his remarks on the type of officer and men required must have been of particular interest to Sir John Moore, Lieut.Colonel MacKenzie and others.

As regards the non-commissioned officers, they should be young, active, brave, and trustworthy, "and none of those old, worn-out, ill-behaved and ill-natured fellows, as is in general the case; because (when a light corps is in process of being formed) the regiments of the line seize such opportunities to get rid of their worst men" (p. 10.)

Recruits should be carefully selected, and should be picked out for their physical qualities, and not to swell the ranks. They should not be under five feet four inches in height, and in no case over thirty years old. Old soldiers should not be sought after. They perceive dangers quicker than the young. Concerning his first experience in the American War (October 26th, 1776), he writes : "My old soldiers were the first who perceived our situation, and I was forsaken by many of them, but the young lads stood by me in the innocence of their hearts, and to them I owed the preservation of myself and my party" (p. 12).

Von Ewald insists upon the discipline of all ranks as an essential of success. "There is nothing impossible!" he writes; "give your orders, support them with firmness, and you will see every obstacle vanish" (p. 35). As to punishments, he believed in those of a moral rather than of a physical type. The best method of dealing with hardened sinners is: "To strip them naked to the shirt, shave their heads, and turn them out in the most shameful manner before the front of the whole corps; punishments of this sort make a deeper impression than the severest corporal ones" (p. 13.)

But true discipline, he maintains, is not based on punishment, but on skill, which creates self-reliance: "The soldier himself feels a certain confidence and pride from the consciousness of his skill," and is, therefore, "prepared for everything." This is, indeed, the true basis of all discipline.

The spirit of von Ewald's tactics is the offensive, and though he deals lengthily with protective services which, in his day, formed such an important part of the duties of the light troops, he never forgets that to fight means to hit. Do not waste your time evolving plans of operations in your head, make your dispositions immediately, and charge the enemy resolutely, even if he be superior : "For it is a general rule in war that he who begins the attack has already half the victory, and fortune generally favours the resolute and brave, and very often, indeed, the rash" (p. 123.) And then he adds a remark which is the essence of the light infantry fight: "The riflemen must endeavour by their destructive fire to annoy and weaken the enemy on all sides from afar" (p. 124.) That is, they must demoralise so as to render the assault possible.

Never lose sight of your principal object; do not act contrary to your orders; do not be led astray by secondary issues; go straight for the main issue, and do not rest until you have conquered it (p. 123.) But do not be pedantic and small-minded; if in carrying out an order you find that circumstances have changed since it was given you, disobey it resolutely, if your wits tell you you are doing right, but, if you do so, take care to acquaint the issuer of the order with what you have done. Fear nothing (p. 142.)

If you be frequently alarmed by the enemy, do not suffer it quietly, but alarm him still more frequently, in order to keep him in awe, and tire him out" (p. 146).

"Should you receive certain intelligence that the enemy intend a surprise upon your post, and be also assured of the road he will take, march at the same time by another road upon his own post, carry off all he may have left in it, observing to follow, on your return, the road by which the enemy went, and which, according to the principles of the art of war, he will not certainly take on his return" (p. 159.)

“Whatever is unexpected strikes the mind with fear, and when you hazard most, most is to be gained." " . . . The word surprisal, properly speaking, should not be known in war. . . . For to say an officer has been surprised, is the same as saying he has lost by his own negligence, ignorance, or obstinacy, the honour, liberty or lives of himself and many men who were entrusted to him" (p. 190.)

If surrounded or in a tight corner, listen to no representation; persevere in your resolution, for: "A glorious death is certainly preferable to life at the price of ever so good a capitulation" (p. 179.) Recollect always the old saying, "He who never runs, can never be pursued" (p. 265.)

From the offensive I will now turn to the protective services of light infantry, and here again von Ewald is just as decisive. He is neither blinded by the attack nor is he enthralled by the defence; he sees all things clearly and in proportion. "Never think yourself fully secure" (p. 121,) he writes. He tells a good story of how a Spanish officer, hearing that a French officer and forty cavalry would enter a certain hollow-way during the night-time, lay in wait for them. The French blundered into the trap and were cut down. The Spanish officer gave the French officer two cuts with his sabre, with this advice: "Learn your duty better for the future, and before you march your men through a country, examine it" (p. 54.) Leave no cover unsearched either on the move or when at rest: When halted at once cover yourself with outposts, and post single sentries by day and double by night (p. 169). Be always vigilant and especially so on rough windy nights, and make use of them to surprise the enemy's posts.

"A thick mist will favour your approach; and when hard rain and high wind drive in the faces of the sentries, they put down their heads, forget themselves often, and turn their backs to the rain and wind, by which you may easily steal to them, and stab them unawares. . . . In such weather you cannot visit your own posts too often." If you surprise the enemy's outposts, rush upon them, "and endeavour to enter his camp at the same time with him" (p. 197.)

Outpost work does not only consist in posting sentries, but also in sending out frequently patrols "towards the enemy in order to procure timely intelligence of his motions and approach" (p. 144). These patrols should move out at uncertain hours and especially before daybreak (p. 146). Further, in intersected country, von Ewald lays down that in advance of the outpost line small standing posts should be placed, along likely avenues of approach, whose duty it is to alarm the outposts themselves if an enemy approaches. He adds: "Supposing that it should occasion the loss of a man or two; so inconsiderable a loss is not adequate to the immense advantage which would result from this measure; and if the Jaegers be properly trained, it will seldom happen" (p. 145.)

Night work receives very careful consideration by von Ewald; he sees in it great possibilities for active, well-led troops. He insists absolutely on the offensive being assumed should the enemy be met unawares (p. 50). On a night march the advanced guard should be quite near, and preceded by an officer on foot some fifty paces ahead: "Everyone should march in the greatest silence, smoke no tobacco, and all those who are subject to coughs and colds must be left behind on such occasion. No horse must be taken that is accustomed to neigh" (p. 201.) Bayonets alone should be relied on, and the rifles of the advanced guard should not even be loaded (p. 208): If a panic occurs, whether by day or night, do not cry "Halt! Stand!" but endeavour to reach the first fugitives and form them up, which will be easily done as they see behind them many more for protection" (p. 266.)

The whole of Colonel von Ewald's book is full of useful hints, stratagems and experiences. "If your men go marauding," he writes, "catch them and thrash them in front of the inhabitants, by which you recommend yourself . . . and gain the attachment of the whole country" (p. 237.) "If you desire to obtain food from the inhabitants, seize the most wealthy individuals and threaten to hang them unless bread and meat are at once forthcoming" (p. 122.) "But should you wish to discover the conditions of the roads, do not question the rich inhabitants, for they will always represent the roads worse than they really are, in order to prevent a visit into their country" (p. 186.)